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ARTICLE
RULES ARE MADE TO BE BROKEN: HOW THE
PROCESS OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL FAILS
ASYLUM SEEKERS
MICHELE R. PISTONE AND JOHN J. HOEFFNER*
Expedited removal, whereby a person arriving in the United States can be
removed within forty-eight hours and barred from returning for up to five
years without any judicial oversight or review,1 is one of the greatest powers
any agency of the United States government possesses. This power was
originally granted to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(IIRIRA).2 Since the expedited removal provisions of IIRIRA became
effective in April 1997, the INS and its successor agency, Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) – a division of the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS)3 – have removed more than 500,000 persons from the United
States via the expedited removal process.4 This Article examines and
explains the impact of the expedited removal process on genuine asylum
seekers and explores possibilities for improving the system.
In addition to the potentially enormous consequences for individuals
subject to expedited removal – genuine asylum seekers who are wrongly
removed, for example, are by definition at risk of suffering persecution,
torture or death – what makes the expedited removal authority perhaps
* Michele R. Pistone is a Professor of Law, Director of the Clinical Program, and the founding
Director of the Clinic for Asylum, Refugee and Emigrant Services at Villanova University School of
Law. John J. Hoeffner, her husband, is an attorney residing in Villanova, Pa.
1. INA § 235(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A) (2005).
2. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
100 Stat. 3009 (codified in numerous sections of 8 U.S.C.).
3. DHS was established by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Pursuant to that Act, the INS was
abolished on March 1, 2003, and its functions were absorbed by DHS, and distributed among its
various sub-parts, such as CBP.
4. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 149 (2004)
(noting 421,976 expedited removals from 1997 to 2003).
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uniquely weighty is not simply the lack of judicial oversight, but the near
absence of oversight of any kind. This combination of circumstances does
not exist with other substantial powers. The criminal justice authority, an
analogous power in terms of its focus on individuals and its impact on them,
is circumscribed by appellate review, the right to trial by jury and the right to
counsel, as well as by the accessibility of the process to the press and public.
Expedited removal, however, typically takes place out of public view, with
only CBP inspectors – acting as judge, jury and oftentimes prosecutor –
present.
The importance of the expedited removal process to the individuals
affected and the unreviewable finality of CBP’s decisions make it imperative
that CBP err as little as possible. Yet, to ensure removal and due to economic
and security-based concerns, CBP also expects to make and implement most
of its deportation decisions under expedited removal within forty-eight hours
of an applicant’s arrival.5 There is considerable tension between high speed
and high accuracy and fairness, and no one could reasonably expect perfec-
tion from any system that is subjected to these dueling demands. Some
errors, in other words, may be necessary evils.
The history of the development of expedited removal makes clear that the
inherent conflict between speedy decision-making and accurate and fair
decision-making was well understood at the procedure’s inception.6 The
formidable task that befell those charged with creating the administrative
rules to implement the mostly vague directive of Congress was to make
expedited removal approximate, as much as possible, the much lengthier and
more considered review formerly available as a matter of course in formal
hearings before immigration judges. At those hearings, the goals of accuracy
and fairness in decision-making were advanced by, among other things,
affording applicants for admission the right to present witnesses and evi-
dence in support of their defense to removal, the right to cross-examine any
government witnesses, and the right to be represented by counsel (at no
expense to the government). In addition, the deportation decisions of immi-
gration judges were subject to review by the Board of Immigration Appeals
and the federal courts.7
Under expedited removal, these rights had to be approximated rather than
duplicated because duplication would destroy the summary nature of the
5. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL’N. NO. GAO/GGD-98-81, ILLEGAL ALIENS: CHANGES IN
THE PROCESS OF DENYING ALIENS ENTRY INTO THE UNITED STATES 44 (1998) [hereinafter CHANGES IN
THE PROCESS] (estimating that 95% of aliens who received removal orders were removed within 48
hours of their arrival).
6. See generally PHILIP A. SCHRAG, A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR: THE CONGRESSIONAL BATTLE TO
SAVE POLITICAL ASYLUM IN AMERICA 193-224 (2000) [hereinafter A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR] (detailing
the perspectives of numerous parties formally or informally involved in shaping IIRIRA and the
administrative response to it, and the parties’ attempts to anticipate and rebut opposing arguments that
would sacrifice unduly accuracy, for example, for the sake of speed).
7. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (repealed 1996).
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process. Full rights could not be afforded without ignoring both congres-
sional legislative intent as well as substantial congressional sentiment, which
would have preferred “expedited exclusion to be done at the airport within an
hour after the person arrive[d].”8 After much negotiation both inside and
outside the INS,9 exactly such a form of approximate justice emerged in the
compromise set of final regulations promulgated by the agency in December
2000.10
To the extent that this set of regulations applied to potential asylum
seekers, it provided the following safeguards against immigration inspectors
erroneously deporting persons with genuine claims of asylum through the
expedited removal process. First, in place of a broad right to develop
evidence and present witnesses, applicants were to be allowed to offer their
own statements and whatever documentary evidence they happened to be
carrying with them. Second, rather than relying on judges, lawyers or others
(such as previously admitted immigrants) to provide – inside or outside of the
courtroom – a statement of the law,11 immigration inspectors would be
required to read aloud a short statement to the newly-arrived applicant; the
statement purposely avoided the word “asylum,” but did generally note the
existence of protections available to persons who feared being returned to
their home country. Third, in place of giving the applicant or his or her lawyer
time to develop the record, as well as the benefit of clarifying questions that
were frequently posed by judges in deportation proceedings, immigration
inspectors would be required to ask and record the answers to three specific
questions designed to elicit evidence of a possible claim of asylum. Fourth, in
place of a verified record established by court reporters or audiotaping, upon
the completion of an interview, immigration inspectors would have the
applicant read and sign the inspector’s record of the meeting. Finally, instead
of a right to appeal adverse decisions to the Board of Immigration Appeals
and the federal courts, including the United States Supreme Court, the
regulations provided for a single review by a second-line supervisor.
In almost every particular, the promise of these carefully drawn and
negotiated compromise safeguards has been broken through a failure to apply
them adequately and with consistency. As a result of the failure to apply
established regulations, more genuine asylum seekers have been erroneously
deported to their homelands than was required by the balance struck in
8. A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR, supra note 6, at 204 (quoting an unnamed INS official).
9. See id. at 193-213.
10. Asylum Procedures, 65 Fed. Reg. 76,121 (Dec. 6, 2001).
11. “Throughout his or her time in the secondary inspection area, the alien is not permitted to
meet with, or contact, counsel (or anyone else other than Customs and Border Patrol personnel).”
U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 1 REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN EXPEDITED REMOVAL:
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 21 (2005) [hereinafter USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1]. The USCIRF
report was published in two volumes; the title of the second volume differs slightly from the first
volume’s title. See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, 2 REPORT ON ASYLUM SEEKERS IN
EXPEDITED REMOVAL: EXPERT REPORTS (2005) [hereinafter USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2].
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IIRIRA between speedy and accurate decision-making. Indeed, a recent
two-volume report by the bipartisan United States Commission of Interna-
tional Religious Freedom (USCIRF) indicates that the deficiencies of the
expedited removal program continue to date.12 In documenting “serious
problems” in the program,13 the USCIRF report confirms a smaller study
conducted in 2000 by the General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO’s
2000 report is graciously titled Opportunities Exist to Improve the Expedited
Removal Process.14
It is cause for great concern that, five years later, many of the same
“opportunities” are still available. The persistence of problems in the
expedited removal program represents, first of all, a continuing violation
of the United States’ obligations under an international treaty to which it
is a signatory – the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.15
Moreover, mistakes made during expedited removal inspections poten-
tially subject deported individuals to persecution – including imprison-
ment, torture and death – and actually will result in such persecution in at
least some cases. In addition, even if they escape persecution, persons
erroneously deported via expedited removal are still likely to be subjected
to a five-year bar on returning to the United States.16 Depending on one’s
individual circumstances, this too could be a considerable hardship.
Some commentators have looked at these lamentable consequences and
suggested that the elimination of the expedited removal process is the
only appropriate solution. As early as 1999, for example, the Advisory
Committee on Religious Freedom Abroad, which reported to the Secre-
tary of State and to the President of the United States, called for the
“[r]epeal of expedited removal,” noting that repeal “should be a high
priority for the Administration.”17 Many other persons and groups have
12. USCIRF is an independent federal agency charged with monitoring religious freedom
worldwide. It was established by the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. Section 605 of
that Act authorized USCIRF’s recent study on the implementation of expedited removal, and granted
USCIRF “virtually unrestricted access to Expedited Removal proceedings.” USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1,
supra note 11, at 3.
13. Id. at 10.
14. U.S. GEN ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBL’N. NO. GAO/GGD-00-176, OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO
IMPROVE THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL PROCESS (Sept. 2000) [hereinafter OPPORTUNITIES EXIST]. As was
the USCIRF report, the 2000 GAO report also was authorized by the International Religious Freedom
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-292, 112 Stat. 2812. OPPORTUNITIES EXIST studies issues related to
“expedited removal and those who claimed a fear of persecution or torture in their home country.”
OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra at 4. In particular, the report addresses “INS’ management controls over
(1) the expedited removal process and (2) the credible fear determination process, including those
determinations relating to aliens’ decisions to recant their claims of a fear of persecution or torture.”
Id.
15. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. 267
[hereinafter Refugee Protocol]. The Refugee Protocol holds that, by ratifying it, signatories are bound
by Articles 2-34 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees. Id. at art. I(1).
16. INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2005).
17. ADVISORY COMM. ON RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ABROAD, FINAL REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF
STATE AND TO THE PRESIDENT 45 (1999).
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issued similar calls.18
The rationale behind these calls for repeal is not entirely without basis, for
to some extent speed will always be at war with accuracy. But the mere fact
that a process is imperfect does not mean that it is appropriate to discard it –
as engineers say, the standard of measurement for assessing adequacy is not
perfection; rather, the standard is the alternative. In this case, in these times,
many thoughtful students of expedited removal have seen no other alterna-
tive that addresses as well as expedited removal the security concerns that
were presented in stark relief on September 11, 2001.
Yet, while many of the harms caused by expedited removal may be
regarded and accepted as necessary evils, one cannot rest comfortably with
those conclusions without quantifying the extent of the harms. Few things in
life are appropriate no matter what; accordingly, in assessing the wisdom of
expedited removal it matters, or should matter, whether genuine asylum
seekers are erroneously deported only occasionally, or by the hundreds, or by
the thousands. Indeed, if the latter figure is correct, even the most ardent
supporters of expedited removal might reconsider their position.
Before any group so acts, however, they may appropriately ask whether it
is possible to create an expedited removal system less prone to error. Many of
the “necessary” evils of the expedited removal process may not be so
necessary after all, and may be avoided in ways short of repealing the
authority. If this is true, those persons most sensitive to security and other
concerns that provided the rationales for expedited removal may become the
staunchest supporters of expedited removal’s reform.
After briefly outlining the expedited removal process in Part I, the
remainder of this Article will explore both of these issues – first, the
estimated number of erroneously deported asylum seekers, and then, whether
and how this number could be reduced. As for the first issue, limiting
ourselves to the data found in the two most extensive studies of expedited
removal, and then only to errors that stem from a failure to follow already
established regulations, Parts II and III will demonstrate the likelihood that
tens of thousands of persons have been wrongly deported via expedited
removal and that many thousands have been wrongly denied asylum. In other
words, though based on conservative premises, our estimate is that more
genuine refugees have mistakenly been deported pursuant to the expedited
removal authority than even the most vocal opponents feared.
The implications of this showing are enormous. They certainly place a
18. THE LAWYERS COMM. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, IS THIS AMERICA? THE DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS TO
ASYLUM SEEKERS IN AMERICA, app. 4 (2000) [hereinafter IS THIS AMERICA?] (listing over fifty groups
who called for the general repeal of expedited removal, including Amnesty International USA, the
American Civil Liberties Union, the American Immigration Law Foundation, Human Rights Watch,
and the National Council of La Raza); American Immigration Lawyers Association, America’s
Borders: From Our Consulates to Our Ports of Entry Balancing Our Security and Economic Needs,
AILA’S IMMIGRATION THIS WEEK (May 26, 2005) (suggesting repeal would enhance U.S. security);
see also Anthony Lewis, A Bad Time for Civil Liberties, 5 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 (1999).
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high burden upon all responsible officials, but especially upon continued
proponents of expedited removal, to work to ensure that harms resulting from
the process are reduced as soon and as much as possible. How might this be
accomplished?
In addressing this question, Part IV argues that improvement must begin
with a change in the culture of the responsible agency. Part IV lists a number
of ways to try to achieve this end, and makes some other suggestions as well.
We think the reforms we suggest will reduce the likelihood of mistakes in the
future. We also think that, as currently practiced, the expedited removal
process is troubled enough that substantial reforms have become an absolute
necessity. If such reforms fail, or worse, are never even attempted, and the
present failed system continues, the entire premise of expedited removal –
that it can achieve widely acceptable levels of accuracy and fairness – will
have been undermined. Remaining supporters of expedited removal will be
forced to argue that, although the mistaken expulsion of thousands of
legitimate asylum seekers has been shown by experience to be an expected
element of the expedited removal regime, the unexpectedly disappointing
status quo is but a necessary evil outweighed by other concerns. Should this
course of events come to pass, one need not imagine that it is only against a
standard of perfection that expedited removal will be deemed by most
observers to have fallen short.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL PROCESS
CBP inspects persons seeking admission to the United States at border
crossings, airports and seaports. There are two phases in the inspections
process: a primary and a secondary interview. At the primary interview, CBP
officers inspect a traveler’s identity and travel documents, such as passports,
visas, or permanent residency cards. Non-citizens are questioned about their
travel purposes and intentions, including the “applicant’s intended length of
stay and whether the applicant intends to remain permanently.”19 Most
persons pass quickly through this stage and are allowed to leave the port of
entry and enter the country. Approximately 300 million applicants for
admission are processed annually via the primary inspection process.20
When the primary inspector believes that an individual is ineligible for
admission, the inspector sends the person to a secondary inspection area.
Most of the seven to ten million persons sent to secondary inspection each
year are processed without an extensive interview and are allowed to enter
the country after additional document screening and security checks through
19. INA § 235(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5) (2005).
20. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 32 (reporting 332 million primary inspections in
2001, and 265 million in 2003); OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at 20 (noting 28.3 million
primary inspections per month from April 1, 1997, to September 30, 1999).
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various databases.21 Approximately ten percent, however, are subject to a
more probing interview by a secondary inspector in a secondary inspection
interview.22 If no secondary inspector is immediately available, applicants
may be restrained with handcuffs and sometimes with shackles until the
interview begins.23
The secondary interview typically lasts about an hour.24 During the
interview, the inspector can review any documents an individual is carrying,
but passengers arriving by sea or air are not allowed to retrieve documents
from checked luggage.25 Moreover, applicants cannot seek the help of a
lawyer or assistance from friends or family during the interview. As a result,
the process places a premium on the ability of an applicant to verbalize his or
her story, a requirement that is especially problematic when, as is sometimes
the case, the interview is conducted in a language that the applicant does not
adequately understand.26 At the end of the interview, the inspector may either
allow the individual to enter the country, deny admission, or send him or her
to a “credible fear” interview, the last alternative being reserved for possible
asylum applicants.27
Regarding the denial of admission, expedited removal laws expressly
authorize secondary inspectors to deny admission to persons who arrive
at an airport, seaport or land border without proper travel documents28 or
who carry documents that CBP officials suspect have been procured
21. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 6 (reporting that “the number of aliens sent to
Secondary Inspection per year approximate 10 million, and 90 percent of these individuals are
ultimately allowed to enter the U.S. after being processed through an initial triage”); OPPORTUNITIES
EXIST, supra note 14, at 20 (noting that from April 1, 1997 to September 30, 1999, a monthly average
of 601,000 individuals were sent to secondary inspection).
22. See OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at 18-19; USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at
6.
23. See Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved But Still Unfair,
16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 61-62 (2001) [hereinafter Pistone & Schrag] (noting “the nearly universal use
of oppressive restraints”); IS THIS AMERICA?, supra note 18, at 26 (stating that the vast majority of
persons in the expedited removal process was restrained); Rachel L. Swarns, U.N. Report Cites
Harassment of Immigrants Who Sought Asylum at American Airports, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 2004, at
A11 (stating that “asylum seekers were routinely handcuffed and restrained with belly chains and leg
restraints”). But see USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 27 (noting that recent CBP guidelines
have now made shackling extremely rare even at JFK International Airport, the place where it was
most often practiced).
24. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 6.
25. See Pistone & Schrag, supra note 23, at 39 n.217.
26. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 31 (noting that “on more than one occasion aliens
were refused interpreters . . . even when they requested them”); Swarns, supra note 23, at A11 (citing
U.N. report stating that certified translators often were not provided for asylum seekers who did not
speak English). See also Pistone & Schrag, supra note 23, at 55 (noting “reluctance of INS inspectors
to call upon interpreters during secondary inspections”).
27. In limited cases, the inspections officer can also allow the individual to withdraw his or her
application for admission, thereby achieving the same result of removal while avoiding an official
record of denial of admission. Withdrawal might be preferable to an individual who does not want an
order of removal on his record because the order of removal can result in a five-year bar on returning
to the United States. INA § 212(a)(9)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(i) (2005).
28. See INA § 212(a)(7), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7) (2005).
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through fraud.29 Such persons may be deported “without further hearing
or review,”30 subject only to a supervisor’s approval of the order.31
IIRIRA further forbids courts from reviewing expedited removal deci-
sions.32
Unfortunately, the nature of their claims makes genuine asylum seekers –
who by definition are fleeing persecution based on race, religion, nationality,
political opinion or membership in a particular social group – disproportion-
ately likely to find themselves in a secondary inspection interview. The
government that normally grants travel documents is the government from
which they are fleeing. For such individuals, to seek travel documents, or to
show authentic identifying documents to government officials, could be
dangerous; accordingly, asylum seekers often do not carry any documents
that would properly identify them. In addition, asylum seekers fleeing
imminent harm may not have had time to obtain the usual documents. As a
result, asylum seekers often come to the United States without valid travel
documents, and hence such potential asylees become ensnared in the second-
ary inspection process.
For asylum seekers without proper travel documents, the secondary
inspection interview is the most critical stage of the expedited removal
process. At this stage they must indicate either a fear of persecution or the
intent to apply for asylum. Failure to do so subjects them to expedited
removal. On the other hand, individuals who request asylum or give second-
ary inspectors information about their fear of return are required to be
removed from the secondary inspection area and sent to detention centers.33
There, asylum seekers are interviewed once again – this time by an asylum
officer.34 At this interview, asylum applicants must prove that they have a
“credible fear of persecution.”35 Those applicants who are able to meet this
29. See INA § 212(a)(6)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) (2005).
30. INA § 235(b)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5) (2005).
31. 8 C.F.R. § 235.4(b)(7) (2005). Specifically, the applicable regulation states:
[A]ny removal order entered by a [secondary inspector] must be reviewed and approved by the
appropriate supervisor before the order is considered final. Such supervisory review shall not
be delegated below the level of a second line supervisor, or a person acting in that capacity.
The supervisory review shall include a review of the sworn statement and any answers and
statements made by the alien regarding a fear of removal or return.
Id.
32. See INA § 235(b)(1)(C), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(C) (2005); 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(5) (2005).
33. The detention centers may be owned and managed by DHS (or, more specifically, by
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), another component of DHS). ICE also may rent bed
space in prisons run by other authorities. For a discussion of these prisons under ICE’s predecessor
agency, the INS, see Michele R. Pistone, Justice Delayed Is Justice Denied, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J.
197, 204 (1999).
34. INA § 235(b)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B) (2005). An asylum officer is specially trained
in asylum and refugee law and in the human rights conditions in foreign countries. 8 C.F.R. § 208.1(b)
(2005).
35. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2005). The term “credible fear of
persecution” is statutorily defined to mean “that there is a significant possibility, taking into account
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burden of proof are eligible to apply to an immigration judge for asylum
protection.36 Those who do not establish a credible fear to the satisfaction of
the asylum officer are entitled to an extremely limited review by an
immigration judge.37 An immigration judge’s affirmation of the asylum
officer’s negative credible fear determination will, in most cases, subject the
applicant to deportation within forty-eight hours, the same fate that awaits
persons who receive deportation orders by secondary inspectors.
II. SOURCES OF ERROR IN THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL PROCESS
Part II will demonstrate that, in practice, the extensive protections for-
merly offered in deportation proceedings have, in many applications of the
expedited removal process, been replaced by precisely . . . nothing. Even in
the abbreviated fashion envisioned by DHS regulations, the law is not
explained, the facts are not explored, verification is inadequate and supervi-
sory review is effectively absent. As a result, a randomness and arbitrariness
has been introduced into the expedited removal process that is wholly at odds
with the expectations of its sponsors.
Part II(A) examines secondary inspectors’ failure to follow regulations
designed to identify genuine asylum seekers; Part II(B) discusses similar
failures by local supervisors, as well as by higher-level managers.
A. The Record Established by Secondary Inspectors is Incomplete and
Unreliable
Numerous flaws pervade the secondary inspection process. First, second-
ary inspectors fail to provide applicants for admission with crucial informa-
tion about the proceedings against them and the possible availability of
protection. Second, inspectors fail to ask mandatory questions designed to
elicit information about possible claims of asylum. Third, contrary to
requirements, individuals who express credible fear during a secondary
inspection interview sometimes are not referred to an asylum officer, but
rather are expeditiously removed. Fourth, in a large majority of the cases,
interview subjects sign the sworn statement portion of the I-867B form used
in expedited removal cases without reviewing it. Fifth, in a disturbing finding
by the only group allowed to widely observe secondary inspection inter-
views, the forms completed by officers more than occasionally contained
assertions never communicated by the applicant. Sixth, in other cases, the
the credibility of the statements made by the alien in support of the alien’s claim and such other facts
as are known to the officer, that the alien could establish eligibility for asylum.” INA § 235(b)(1)(B)(v),
8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v) (2005).
36. The asylum seeker is issued a Form I-862, Notice to Appear, for full consideration of the
claim for protection at removal proceedings pursuant to section 240 of the INA. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(f)
(2005); see also INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2005).
37. See Pistone & Schrag, supra note 23, at 41-42 (detailing limitations of the review process).
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completed forms lacked important information communicated by the appli-
cant. Finally, several studies have documented instances of inspectors refus-
ing to provide interpretive assistance.
1. Inspectors Fail to Communicate Required Information
CBP training materials state that secondary inspectors must use the I-867A
& B forms “in every case in which an alien is determined to be subject to
Expedited Removal.”38 The following paragraphs of the I-867A must be read
to persons subject to expedited removal:
You do not appear to be admissible or to have the required legal
papers authorizing your admission to the United States. This may
result in your being denied admission and immediately returned to
your home country without a hearing. If a decision is made to refuse
your admission into the United States, you may be immediately
removed from this country, and if so, barred from reentry for a
period of 5 years or longer.
This may be your only opportunity to present information to me and the
Immigration and Naturalization Service [sic] to make a decision. It is
very important that you tell me the truth. If you lie or give misinforma-
tion, you may be subject to criminal or civil penalties, or barred from
receiving immigration benefits or relief now or in the future.
U.S. law provides protection to certain persons who face persecution,
harm or torture upon return to their home country. If you fear or have a
concern about being removed from the United States or about being
sent home, you should tell me so during this interview because you may
not have another chance. You will have the opportunity to speak
privately and confidentially to another officer about your fear or
concern. That officer will determine if you should remain in the United
States and not be removed because of that fear.39
Nothing is more crucial in preventing the deportation of genuine
asylum seekers via expedited removal than ensuring that the I-867A
information is communicated; hence, the controlling regulation requires
that the information be read out-loud by the secondary inspector or a
translator.40 The need to do this is particularly acute in the case of the
paragraph that informs individuals that “U.S. law provides protection to
certain persons who face persecution, harm or torture upon return to their
38. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 13.
39. See id. at 252 (copy of I-867A); see also id. at 13 (noting obligatory paragraphs).
40. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(i) (2005) (stating “[t]he examining immigration officer shall read (or
have read) to the alien all information contained on Form I-867A”); see USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2,
supra note 11, at 15 (noting that CBP’s manual also expressly requires that the I-867A be read aloud).
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home country.” Many victims of persecution are from countries that
tightly control information about the ability of victims of persecution to
seek refuge in other countries. Thus, for this or other reasons, many
applicants for admission are unaware of their right to ask for protection
from return and must affirmatively be told about this right by the
inspections officer.41
The same paragraph also contains important information stating that
expressions of fear about returning home will be treated confidentially.
Especially given the prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)
among true victims of persecution,42 as well as the fear that inspectors may
relay claims of persecution back to the home government (and thereby
possibly endanger the applicant, if returned, or his or her family), many
applicants may need to receive the assurance of confidentiality before they
will communicate with their interrogators.
The other paragraphs of the I-867A form are also important and failure to
read them reduces the accuracy of the secondary inspection process as well.43
Unfortunately, if an inspector fails to read the form aloud, or any part of it,
nothing is likely to be done because the omission will likely never be
revealed; the file reviewed by supervisors does not require any assurance that
the I-867A was read. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the form often is
not read at all.
The recent report by USCIRF notes both the extent of the failure to read
the I-867A aloud and the consequences of this omission. For example, with
respect to the failure to read the paragraph informing the applicant of the
availability of protection to people who face persecution, the report states:
DHS regulations require immigration inspectors to follow a standard
script informing each alien that (s)he may ask for protection if (s)he has
41. See Pistone & Schrag, supra note 23, at 25-26 (noting that eventual asylum seekers can even
live in the United States for years without learning of the availability of asylum protection).
42. See, e.g., Mark Van Ommeren et al., Culture, Trauma, and Psychotrauma Programmes, 350
THE LANCET 595 (1997) (noting “increased rates of post-traumatic stress disorder . . . among Turkish,
Palestinian, and Bhutanese survivors of torture”); Pistone & Schrag, supra note 23 at 49 n.272
(collecting studies showing elevated levels of PTSD among refugees). Victims of PTSD may be
reluctant to discuss the source of their trauma, especially absent the establishment of a “trusting
relationship” with an interrogator. See Derrick Silove et al., Anxiety, Depression and PTSD in
Asylum-Seekers: Associations with Pre-Migration Trauma and Post-Migration Stressors, 170 BRIT.
J. PSYCHIATRY 351, 351 (1997) (noting requirement of “trusting relationships”). A promise of
confidentiality can be a start toward establishing that relationship, and thus a start toward communi-
cating the information that may qualify one for asylum.
43. For example, confusion about the expedited removal process is widespread even among
people who have been through it. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 25. Thus, the paragraph
noting that “[t]his may be your only opportunity to present information” may provide new
information to applicants, which might be important in motivating them to talk of possible
persecution, especially combined with the remaining paragraph’s notification of apparent inadmissi-
bility and warning of a five-year bar. Cf. Balasubramanrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 162-63 (3d Cir.
1998) (noting that “an arriving alien who has suffered abuse during interrogation sessions by
government officials in his home country may be reluctant to reveal such information during the first
meeting with government officials in this country”).
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a fear of returning home. In approximately half of inspections observed,
inspectors failed to inform the alien of the information in that part of the
script. Aliens who did receive this information were seven times more
likely to be referred for a credible fear determination than those who
were not.44
The magnitude of these numbers is stunning, especially when one realizes
that the officers knew that they were being observed by USCIRF staff and, as
the USCIRF report notes, “It certainly seems likely that compliance with
required policies could be greater and inappropriate behaviors would be
fewer when observers were monitoring their interviews.”45 In all events, the
demonstrated widespread disregard of the requirement that the I-867A be
read aloud obviously represents a substantial failure.
2. Inspectors Order Expedited Removal Based on Incomplete Statements
Inspection officers are also required to ask three questions found on the
I-867B and record the answers. Those three questions, which are meant to
elicit information relevant to whether a credible fear referral is warranted
(and are therefore known as “fear” questions)46 are:
● Why did you leave your home country or country of last residence?
● Do you have any fear or concern about being returned to your home
country or being removed from the United States?
● Would you be harmed if you are returned to your home country or
country of last residence?47
Despite their mandatory nature, every study of the expedited removal
process and the mandatory questions shows that secondary inspectors repeat-
edly fail to ask, or fail to record the answer to, one or more of the questions.48
The latest study, by USCIRF, found that between 5% and 15% of I-867B’s
44. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 6.
45. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 30. The report continues by noting that “[t]hus, the
rates of problems observed in this study likely underestimate the actual rate of problem behaviors and
failures to adhere to established policies.” Id. The phenomenon by which observers, by their mere
presence, affect examined behaviors is known as the Hawthorne effect.
46. Id. at 13.
47. Id. The I-867B also contains a fourth mandatory question: “Do you have any questions or is
there anything else you would like to add?” Id. at 253. This catch-all question may sometimes be
considered a “fear” question, see USCIRF Report, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 55 (referring to the “four
fear questions”), but its intended scope is broader – to make sure the applicant understands the
process as much as to elicit further information. Perhaps the USCIRF report focuses on the first three
questions for this reason. See, e.g., USCIRF Report, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 13-16.
48. See USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 14-16; OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at
39-40; CHANGES IN THE PROCESS, supra note 5, at 43.
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are incomplete in this manner.49 A comparison with the 2000 GAO study
suggests compliance with this requirement has declined considerably in
recent years.50 It is unclear whether the decline is due to a decrease in
inspector diligence, a lessening of supervisory vigilance, or both. In any
event, the trend is unmistakable, and is an unquestionably negative develop-
ment.51 Indeed, as discussed below in Part II(A)(5), the compliance failure in
this particular respect is greater than the numbers above indicate: the
USCIRF study found, through its direct observation of interviews, that the
CBP’s file record indicating the percentage of times that fear questions had
been asked substantially overstated the actual level of compliance during the
interviews.52
3. Inspectors Issue Removal Orders to Individuals who Express Fear
During Secondary Inspections
DHS regulations state the following:
If an alien subject to the expedited removal provisions indicates an
intention to apply for asylum, or expresses a fear of persecution or
torture, or a fear of return to his or her country, the inspecting officer
shall not proceed further with removal of the alien until the alien has
been referred for [a credible fear] interview by an asylum officer in
accordance with 8 CFR 208.30.53
Both the GAO and USCIRF studies found evidence that this regulation has
not always been obeyed. Thus, in a random sample of 365 case files reviewed
by the GAO, seven case files indicated that an individual was ordered
removed despite having expressed a fear of return.54 USCIRF’s study shows
an even higher level of disregard for the regulation. In that study, “[o]ne in
six aliens who expressed a fear of return during the Secondary Inspection
interview were placed in Expedited Removal or allowed to withdraw their
application for admission.”55 Withdrawal is at the discretion of immigration
officers; however, the request for withdrawal of an application for admission
must be made “strictly voluntar[ily]” by the applicant and “not be coerced in
49. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 14-16 (indicating, at Table 2.1, that a file review
showed approximately a 95% compliance rate for each question, meaning that a minimum of 5% and
a maximum of 15% of all I-867B’s failed to contain an answer to at least one fear question).
50. OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at 39-40.
51. One related bright spot is that while the 1998 and 2000 GAO studies revealed incorrect forms
being used by inspectors and accepted by supervisors in some instances, see OPPORTUNITIES EXIST,
supra note 14, at 44; CHANGES IN THE PROCESS, supra note 5, at 43, the USCIRF study recorded no
such instances.
52. USCIRF REPORT, Vol. 2, supra note 11, at 15-16; see USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11,
at 54.
53. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (2005) (emphasis added).
54. OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at 40.
55. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 29.
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any way.”56 Distressingly, USCIRF’s researchers witnessed several persons
withdraw after expressing fear, with the withdrawals seemingly as a result of
improper encouragement by inspectors.57
The issuance of expedited removal orders to individuals who express fear
during secondary inspections is problematic because it violates the treaty
obligation of non-refoulement, which prohibits the return of a refugee “from
one state to another, especially to one where his or her life would be
threatened.”58 Because secondary inspectors are not qualified to assess “fear”
in the asylum context, as will be discussed in Part II(B)(5), they must not do
so. Rather, they should simply record the applicants’ expressions of fear and
pass the cases on to asylum officers. As will be shown in Part II(B)(5),
confusion among supervisors and upper-level managers appears to cause at
least some of the confusion on the inspector level. Inspectors, therefore, may
not deserve criticism for doing the wrong thing. Nonetheless, when inspec-
tors evaluate and judge levels and types of fear, the wrong thing is being
done.
4. Inspectors Allow Sworn Statements to be Signed Without Being Verified
Given the high stakes involved in removing individuals from the United
States without a judicial hearing and barring them from returning to the
country for up to five years, the regulations seek to ensure that all information
about an applicant for admission that is recorded on the I-867B sworn
statement is accurate and verified. To achieve this goal, the regulations have
incorporated three safeguards into the inspection process.
First, inspectors are required to “have the alien read (or have read to him or
her)” the statement as it is recorded on the form.59 The regulations also
contemplate the possibility that corrections will be made to the statement,
thereby eliminating any errors, misstatements or misunderstandings between
an applicant’s stated answers and the written record. Finally, the regulations
also require the applicant to “sign and initial each page of the statement and
each correction.”60 This last requirement is an effort to have the applicant
56. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 5-6 (quoting CBP training materials) (internal
quotation marks omitted); see also 8 C.F.R. § 235.4 (2005) (stating that “[t]he alien’s decision to
withdraw his or her application for admission must be made voluntarily, but nothing in this section
shall be construed as to give an alien the right to withdraw his or her application for admission.”).
57. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 5-6, 50-51; USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11,
at 23-24; See Swarns, supra note 23, at A11 (noting report by the U.N. High Commissioner for
Refugees describing “instances in which inspectors encouraged asylum seekers not to pursue
asylum”).
58. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1080 (8th ed. 2004); see Refugee Protocol, supra note 15, 19
U.S.T. 6224, 606 U.N.T.S. 267 (constituting U.S. treaty obligation). The Refugee Act of 1980
incorporated the United States’ treaty obligation of non-refoulement into U.S. law. Refugee Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
59. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2005).
60. Id.
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confirm the truth of the statement,61 much as a deponent in litigation is called
upon to certify the truth of a deposition transcript after it is read to or by
him.62
In practice, however, there is a major difference between signing an I-867
and signing a deposition transcript. The deposition transcript will almost
always be in a language the deponent understands; the deposition, after all,
purports to be his or her own words. The same is not true of the I-867. That
form is written in English, which a substantial majority of persons caught in
the expedited removal process do not speak. In fact, in the cases observed by
the USCIRF researchers, it was possible to conduct interviews in English less
than 20% of the time.63
The language difference does not present an insurmountable obstacle to
fulfilling the purpose of the signature requirement. It simply means that the
I-867 will have to be translated before it is signed. However, in practice, the
I-867 often is signed without being translated.
Thus, the USCIRF study found that, while there was 100% compliance
with the signature requirement,64 72% of the signers neither read their
statement nor had it read to them.65 This large majority signed the form in
front of them – as people often do – without knowing or checking its
contents. Contrary to the intent of the signature requirement, therefore, the
presence of a signature does little to ensure the reliability of the sworn
statement.
One might regard this as the failure of the signers, not the inspectors, given
that typically the burden is on a signatory to make sure that he or she
understands a document before signing it.66 In this case, however, the burden
is on the inspectors to be “absolutely certain . . . that the alien has understood
the proceedings against him or her.”67 Moreover, in the majority of cases, it is
impossible for signatories to read the document on his or her own initiative.
Inspectors provide interpreters only when “necessary”68 and, in the USCIRF
study, interpretation was provided 81% of the time.69 However, the state-
ments were read back to the applicants only 17.7 % of the time,70 meaning
61. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 18.
62. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(e), (f)(1).
63. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 10 tbl. 1.4.
64. Id. at 18. The 100% performance represents an improvement over prior measures of
compliance with the signature requirement. See OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at 41 tbl. 2.5
(noting compliance percentages as low as 95%); CHANGES IN THE PROCESS, supra note 5, at 44 (noting
compliance percentages as low as 97%).
65. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 19 tbl. 2.11.
66. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.26, at 295 (1982) (stating that “the law presumes that
a person knows the contents of a document that he executes and understands at least the literal
meaning of its terms,” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
67. CBP Inspector’s Field Manual § 17.15(a).
68. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2005) (“[I]nterpretative assistance shall be used if necessary to
communicate with the alien.”).
69. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 10 tbl. 1.4.
70. Id. at 19 tbl. 2.11.
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that more than 63% of the time the signatories could not know what was in
the document, and that this fact necessarily was known to the inspectors who
had procured interpreters or themselves had to speak to applicants in a
language other than English.
In the vast majority of cases, then, the signature establishes nothing more
than that an applicant for admission sat in front of an inspector as the latter
wrote up a sworn statement. The consequences of this general failure to treat
the signature requirement as anything more than a technical exercise are
substantial. First, an undetected misinterpretation or misunderstanding could
result in a secondary inspector ordering removal of an applicant who has a
viable asylum claim. Second, the same misunderstanding could cause a
supervisor to approve a removal order he might otherwise reject. Third,
because the I-867B will become part of the official record of the case sent on
to credible fear interviews with asylum officers and will then be reviewed
and often given substantial weight by immigration judges and government
attorneys as they deliberate the merits of asylum claims, undetected misunder-
standings could come back to haunt even persons who successfully avoid
expedited removal.71 Finally, the signature requirement and the requirement
that inspectors be “absolutely certain . . . that the alien has understood the
proceedings” have a secondary purpose of protecting the dignitary interests
of applicants. As one scholar has written in a study of social security
disability insurance, “claimant control over the processing of a claim . . . is
important to the development of an adjudicatory process that maintains or
fosters dignity and self-respect.”72 Allowing an applicant a chance to review
his or her statement and to make changes to it before signing certainly could
give the applicant the sense of control that can foster dignity.
5. Inspectors Falsely Attribute Statements to Applicants
USCIRF’s recent congressionally-mandated study of the expedited re-
moval process is “the first systematic evaluation of the Expedited Removal
process utilizing direct observation of Secondary Inspection interviews with
arriving aliens.”73 The results of USCIRF’s study suggest that previous
studies based mainly or exclusively on archival data74 are very likely to have
71. Id. at 67-70 (“Our findings reveal that the Expedited Removal record created during the
Expedited Removal process is in many cases used by immigration judges and DHS trial attorneys to
impeach aliens’ credibility and undermine their claim”).
72. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 133 (1983).
73. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 28.
74. See, e.g., OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at 32-33; CHANGES IN THE PROCESS, supra note
5, at 4; CENTER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, THE EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY:
REPORT ON THE FIRST THREE YEARS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF EXPEDITED REMOVAL 1-2 (May 2000)
[hereinafter EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY]. For years, except for the mandated GAO reports, which
relied mainly on a review of paper files, the INS resisted almost all outside review of the expedited
removal process. Indeed, for several years, it declined not only repeated requests to conduct “on-site
observations of the process” but also, until 2000, “denied access to statistical data on expedited
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substantially underestimated the rate of noncompliance with applicable
regulations.
Thus, the USCIRF report states that “[s]tudy researchers found that the file
often indicated that all four fear questions were asked of the alien, even when
they were not.”75 The discrepancies were substantial. For example, the
USCIRF researchers observed thirty-seven cases in which the first “fear”
question was not asked. However, in thirty-two of those cases, the applicant’s
file nonetheless “incorrectly noted that the question had been asked and
answered.”76 This suggests that actual noncompliance with the requirement
to ask the first mandatory question on the I-867B was almost seven times the
rate indicated by the record files.
6. Inspectors Fail to Include Important Information Conveyed by
Applicants
In some cases, inspectors fail to note significant information offered by the
applicant on the I-867B.77 The most egregious example of this occurs – with
distressing frequency, according to USCIRF – when an individual expresses
fear at secondary inspection but the officer fails to record the fear and orders
expedited removal.78
The failure to record important information can create a problem even for
an individual who passes secondary inspection and moves to a credible fear
interview before an asylum officer and an asylum hearing before an immigra-
tion judge. Immigration judges often deny an asylum claim on the ground
“that the applicant was not credible because the alien’s testimony in court
reflected additional detail not found in the original document from the port of
entry.”79 Because the I-867B is “less than reliable” in constituting a compre-
hensive record of the applicant’s statement, this ground may be factually
wrong. Accordingly, secondary inspectors’ failure to include significant facts
on the I-867B may “lead to the incorrect removal of asylum seekers to
countries where they may face persecution,”80 even when an inspector
decides against ordering expedited removal.
removal.” Id. at 2. The one exception that was made to the veil of secrecy placed over the expedited
removal process might well be regarded as the exception that proves the rule: the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees was granted access to “more than 100 interviews with asylum
seekers at airports,” but only “on the condition that [its] report not be released to the public.” Swarns,
supra note 23, at A11 (discussing leaked report).
75. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 55. For an explanation of the fourth “fear”
question, see supra, note 47.
76. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 15.
77. Id. at 16.
78. Id. at 20.
79. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 57.
80. Id. Although widespread, the practice of relying on the record created at secondary
inspections has its detractors. Id. at 75 (stating that the sworn statement on the I-867B is not reliable,
and therefore recommending that the form include a disclaimer noting that it is not a transcript and is
“not intended to go into detail” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Aravinthan Balasubra-
manrim v. INS, 143 F.3d 157, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1998) (rejecting the reliance of the Board of
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7. Inspectors Fail to Provide Adequate Interpretive Assistance
DHS regulations require that interpretive assistance be used, if necessary, at
secondary inspection.81 The authors of the USCIRF report were surprised to find
that, “despite the presence of researchers observing Secondary Inspection inter-
views, our observers . . . noted that on more than one occasion aliens were refused
interpreters . . . even when they requested them.”82 In this respect, the USCIRF
report confirms findings by several other studies.83
Such refusals, even if only occasional, obviously are troubling. Not only
do the refusals elevate the risk that an inspector will miss an applicant’s
statement of fear and issue a removal order, but they also could eventually
hurt applicants who survive secondary inspection. A record compiled by an
inspector struggling to get by without an interpreter, or including statements
by an applicant struggling to communicate in an unfamiliar language, is
clearly susceptible to being tainted by affirmative misstatements and crucial
omissions. As noted above in Part II(A)(6), such problems can cause
immigration judges to find credibility issues where none truly exist, and
could thus ultimately result in the erroneous return of genuine asylum seekers
to countries where they may be persecuted.
Moreover, much more than occasionally, inspectors provide inadequate
interpretive assistance. In Los Angeles, for example, interpretation is pro-
vided by airline personnel nearly 25% of the time84 and, as CBP itself
recognizes, such interpretation can be problematic.85 The potential problems
include deliberate inaccuracy, as the national or quasi-national nature of
many airlines can foster a bias among airline personnel against a person
alleging persecution by the airline employee’s state; unintentional incompe-
tence, as an untrained interpreter may inappropriately summarize statements
or attempt to resolve ambiguities on his or her own; and incompleteness, as
an applicant may be reluctant to speak openly in front of a known state
employee. An interpreter inadequate for any of these reasons can create the
same difficulties as a complete failure to provide any interpreter at all.
B. Supervisory Review of the Expedited Removal Process Is Ineffective
Supervisory review of expedited removal orders also suffers from serious
shortcomings. This review must be performed by an official at or above “the
Immigration Appeals on the record of a secondary inspections interview because, inter alia, it “may
not be reliable”).
81. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(2)(i) (2005).
82. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 31.
83. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, AMERICAN JUSTICE THROUGH IMMIGRANTS’ EYES 10-11
(2004) (detailing instances of interpretive services being denied); Swarns, supra note 23, at A11
(citing confidential U.N. report stating that certified translators often were not provided for asylum
seekers who did not speak English). See also EXPEDITED REMOVAL STUDY, supra note 74, at 72
(noting instance of inspectors refusing to believe applicants’ inability to speak English).
84. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 11 tbl. 1.6.
85. CBP Inspector’s Field Manual § 17.15(b)(3).
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level of second line supervisor, or a person acting in that capacity.”86 It is
conducted primarily through a review of the I-867B. In theory, no expedited
removal orders can be carried out unless approved by a supervisor. Unfortu-
nately, in practice, this requirement and other regulations are sometimes
ignored. Moreover, other actions are taken as well – including actions by
upper-level managers – that make supervisory review of expedited removal
orders ineffective.
1. Supervisors Accept Incomplete Sworn Statements
It has already been noted in Part II(A)(2) that secondary inspectors
sometimes do not ask or do not record answers to the mandatory questions
listed on the I-867B. The secondary inspectors’ supervisors compound the
error during their own review, by either failing to notice the omissions or
simply ignoring the inspectors’ errors.
This deficiency has persisted throughout the lifetime of the expedited
removal program. The continued and increased existence of the problem,
despite being specifically identified as an issue in government studies
published in 1998, 2000, and 2005,87 suggests a certain over-optimism
among those proponents of expedited removal who thought that supervisory
review would adequately approximate review by the Board of Immigration
Appeals and the federal courts.
Indeed, this suggestion only becomes stronger as one becomes more
familiar with the particulars of the I-867B. The space provided for answer-
ing, or at least to begin to answer, the mandatory questions of the I-867B is
on the face of the form.88 It seems impossible that one would overlook this
space unless one has not looked at all. This suggests that the supervisors’
failure to address the omissions is not only a problem in itself, but also a sign
of larger problems – most of all, it suggests a general unsuitability of
supervisors acting as “courts” of last resort.
2. In Some Cases, No Record Documents that Any Review Was Conducted
The GAO has reported that supervisors at some of the busiest airports in
the United States completely failed to review expedited removal orders in up
to three percent of the cases.89 In such cases, the failure to review an
expedited removal order effectively constitutes a decision to deport the
applicant based on the un-reviewed assessment of a single secondary
inspection officer working in a demonstrably flawed system.
86. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7) (2005).
87. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 14-16; OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at
39-40, 46; CHANGES IN THE PROCESS, supra note 5, at 43.
88. See USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 253 (copy of the I-867B).
89. OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at 40-41.
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3. Supervisory Reviews Are Sometimes Conducted by Unauthorized
Officials
As previously noted, a second line supervisor must perform supervisory
review.90 However, this requirement is sometimes violated when the supervi-
sory review is conducted by “someone other than the second line supervisor
[signing] the order of removal.”91 Presumably, the intent of this rule is to
ensure that the review of a secondary inspector’s removal order is conducted
by someone who understands the importance (and finality) of the review, and
is adequately trained to perform it. Too often, it seems, these assumptions do
not reflect reality, but that unfortunate fact only underscores the seriousness
of the failure to comply with the second line inspector rule. After all, as
flawed as second line supervisor review seems to be, there is absolutely no
reason to believe that an individual not empowered by the regulation to
undertake the responsibility of review will perform even as well as a second
line supervisor.
4. Supervisors Rely on Inadequate Telephonic Review of Records
CBP policies allow expedited removal orders to be approved by telephone
if an appropriate supervisor is not present.92 In practice, supervisory review
in many airports is conducted by telephone at least occasionally and perhaps
in the vast majority of cases. For example, eighty of the ninety-four case files
at JFK International Airport in New York reviewed by the GAO included
evidence of telephonic supervisory review.93
There are at least two problems with telephonic supervisory review. First,
telephonic review inevitably lessens the overall quality of the review process.
Second, telephonic review makes it impossible to conduct with confidence
any systematic study of the review process.
The first problem results from the reality that a telephone conversation
about a written record is not the same as compliance with the regulatory
requirement that a supervisor review “the sworn statement and any answers
and statements made by the alien”94 unless these parts of the record are read
verbatim over the telephone. It is, of course, theoretically possible to read the
statement and answers verbatim over the telephone, but it is quite certain that
it is not done very often. The supervisory review is by a “high level
supervisor”95 who has many other responsibilities; after all, out of every
10,000 persons who arrive at ports of entry, in only one or two cases, on
90. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7) (2005).
91. OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at 44.
92. Id. at 41; CBP Inspector’s Field Manual § 17.15(b)(3).
93. OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at 41.
94. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(7) (2005).
95. David A. Martin, Two Cheers for Expedited Removal in the New Immigration Laws, 40 VA.
J. INT’L L. 673, 682 (2000).
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average, will the supervisor be called upon to exercise his or her responsibil-
ity to review and approve orders for expedited removal.96 Under these
circumstances, when an inspector calls for approval of an expedited removal
order, it is unlikely that the supervisor is leisurely waiting by the telephone,
ready and willing to listen to a possibly lengthy verbatim reading of an
applicant’s statement. Rather, if the supervisor is available at all, the press of
other demands likely encourages a less structured conversation, in which
secondary inspectors, perhaps prompted by supervisors at certain points
(e.g., “was there fear?,” “did he sign it?,” etc.), briefly and contemporane-
ously summarize their interviews.
Such summaries often could omit or mischaracterize important facts that a
verbatim reading of the record would reveal. An abbreviated conversation,
for example, easily could overlook a failure to answer one or more of the fear
questions. Do abbreviated conversations of the sort posited here actually
happen? Surely the demonstrated frequency with which fear questions
actually do go unanswered, and the impossibility of overlooking the failure
to answer if one actually conducted a verbatim reading, constitutes powerful
circumstantial evidence that the answer is “yes.” Moreover, for a proponent
of telephonic review to argue that the answer is “no” would, if successful, be
to win the battle but to lose the war over the appropriateness of the current
system – it would mean that high level supervisors are approving deporta-
tions despite being expressly and routinely made aware that forms are
incomplete in crucial respects.
More likely, we think, than that cynical view, is that abbreviated, i.e.
non-verbatim, telephonic reviews are, above all, good faith responses to
substantial time pressures. In addition, supervisors and secondary inspectors
can find common ground in the fact that non-verbatim telephonic review has
the additional bureaucratic appeal of lessening accountability on both ends of
the line. When non-verbatim telephonic supervision is utilized, there is no
written record of what is communicated to the supervisor. One cannot tell
whether a supervisor made a mistake in evaluating the facts, or if the
secondary inspector omitted or mischaracterized facts. Unfortunately, as the
lack of accountability dawns on employees, the incentive to work carefully is
lessened. Indeed, in the past and perhaps still, the lack of accountability was
96. Approximately 300 million people will arrive at U.S. ports in a given year. Approximately
3.3% of this group, or ten million people, will be directed to secondary inspections. Ten percent of
this ten million, i.e., one million, will go through a long interview and truly be at risk of being
immediately deported. In 2003, 43,336 of the latter group actually were ordered deported via
expedited removal (almost double this number were given permission to withdraw). In other words,
4.3% of persons truly at risk of receiving expedited removal orders actually received them; .43% of
persons diverted for any length to secondary inspections actually were deported via expedited
removal; and .013% of persons – or 1.3 persons out of every 10,000 — who arrived hoping to enter
the country were given expedited removal orders. See USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 32
(statistical information); USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 6 (noting 90% of persons sent to
secondary inspection pass through quickly).
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reinforced by the failure of supervisors to keep any record establishing that a
review took place, despite training guidance recommending that approving
officials keep a log of telephonic concurrence to ensure that all cases are
properly approved. 97
In sum, telephonic review thus not only fails as a means of conducting an
effective review, it succeeds far too well in masking the particular source of
any errors that may be made. Absent any changes in procedure, this baleful
combination has the unfortunate consequence of making systematic review
by others, including even higher-ranking CBP officials, both necessary and
impossible.
5. High-Level Managers and Supervisors Have Inexcusably Confused the
Standard to be Applied When Applicants Express Fear in the Secondary
Inspections Interview
CBP claims that certain expressions of fear in an expedited removal
hearing should not result in a referral for a credible fear determination. CBP’s
claim finds expression in section 17.15(b) of the CBP Inspectors’ Field
Manual, which authorizes inspectors to deport, via expedited removal, even
persons who have expressed fear in response to the I-867B’s fear questions
when the fear “would clearly not qualify that individual for asylum.”98 This
instruction is vulnerable on numerous grounds.
The first objection to allowing inspectors to evaluate the adequacy of an
applicant’s fear assertion is that it flatly contradicts the DHS regulation it is
intended to facilitate. As noted previously, that regulation states:
If an alien subject to the expedited removal provisions indicates an
intention to apply for asylum, or expresses a fear of persecution or
torture, or a fear of return to his or her country, the inspecting officer
shall not proceed further with removal of the alien until the alien has
been referred for [a credible fear] interview by an asylum officer in
accordance with 8 CFR 208.30.99
The statute this regulation is meant to implement states that, upon an
expression of fear, “the officer shall refer the alien for an interview by an
asylum officer. . . .”100 As far as the action required upon an expression of
fear is concerned, the regulation thus differs from the statute it is implement-
ing only in that the regulation’s command “not [to] proceed further” makes
explicit what is obviously implicit in the statute.
A strict constructionist might hold that CBP’s interpretations of the statute
97. OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at 41.
98. CBP Inspector’s Field Manual § 17.15 (2003); see USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at
6, 53-54; USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 20.
99. 8 C.F.R. § 235.3(b)(4) (2005) (emphasis added).
100. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2005) (emphasis added).
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and regulation are self-refuting. To claim, as CBP does, that the “shall” in the
statute means “may” and that the unqualified direction in the regulation that
an inspector “shall not proceed further” actually allows an inspector to
proceed further might be characterized as a step through the looking glass
into an Alice in Wonderland world where words “mean just what [we] choose
[them] to mean – neither more nor less.”101 Our view is more flexible, though
not infinitely so. Perhaps there is room to proceed further but, at the very
least, one’s call for flexibility must make sense in the larger statutory scheme.
Accordingly, to consider another example, calls to flexibly interpret the
express statutory command that inadmissible persons without proper travel
documents “shall [be] removed . . . without further hearing or review,”102
might appropriately be viewed with at least initial skepticism. When engag-
ing in statutory interpretation, one must always keep in mind the possibility
that Congress actually meant exactly what it said. Certainly the government’s
position has always been that – except for certain expressly articulated
exceptions – Congress meant exactly what it said when it framed the core
expedited removal power to deport “without further hearing or review.”
The same might be said of the proscription against “proceed[ing] further”
once a fear is articulated. Indeed, just as the power to deport “without further
hearing or review” is at the core of expedited removal’s effectiveness, at the
core of the asylum protection that provides the main exception to expedited
removal’s jurisdiction over travelers without papers is the ability to halt the
process with an expression of fear. Thus, one might conclude that the rule and
its exception each might be interpreted in the same way, as absolute in their
respective spheres.
With its claim that secondary inspectors can “proceed further” in some
cases, CBP has rejected this parallel interpretation. Whether such a position
is sensible depends upon practical questions of implementation and the
compatibility of the position with the overall regulatory scheme. Considered
in the light of these concerns, the CBP policy is objectionable in the extreme.
Ironically, another section of the CBP Inspector’s Field Manual best
explains the most fundamental practical objection:
The alien may convey fear of violence or harm, a need for protection, an
indication of harm to, or disappearance of, relatives or associates, or
dangerous conditions in his or her country. Even disputes of a personal
nature sometimes may relate to asylum, such as domestic violence,
sexual or child abuse, child custody problems, coercive marriage or
family planning practices, or forced female genital mutilation. All
officers should recognize that sometimes unusual cases have been
found eligible for asylum that may not have initially appeared to relate
101. LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE, in THE
ANNOTATED ALICE 129, 213 (2000) (quoting Humpty Dumpty).
102. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (2005).
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to the five grounds contained in the definition of refugee, such as AIDS
victims who face government persecution, land or money disputes with
wealthy persons or persons in power, whistle blowers, witnesses to
crime and even organized crime connections. Do not make judgment
decisions concerning any fear of persecution, torture, or return. If in
doubt, refer to an asylum officer for a determination. Any alien who by
any means indicates a fear of persecution or return may not be removed
from the United States until the alien has been interviewed by an
asylum officer.103
To paraphrase, asylum determinations require the special training of asylum
officers. Because inspection officers do not have that training, they must
recognize their limitations and refrain from making any judgments when fear
is mentioned, except the judgment to refer the matter to an asylum officer.
This recognition of the limitations of inspectors has long been understood
as demanding a low fear threshold at secondary inspections. Thus, when the
I-867B was being developed, an early draft included a fear question asking,
“what is the nature of [your] fear or concern [about being sent home]?” The
proposed question was eliminated from the form after it was noted that
“inspectors lacked training that would enable them to distinguish between
qualifying and non-qualifying types of fears.”104 Indeed, at the time, INS
officials not only acknowledged inspectors’ present lack of training in asylum
law, they also expressed that “inspectors would not be trained in the nuances
of asylum law” in the future.105
Time has proven this belief entirely well founded. Reports by the USCIRF
and others confirm that secondary inspectors are still not trained in asylum
law and thus remain unable to distinguish between qualifying and non-
qualifying fears.106 Under these circumstances, the only policy that suffi-
ciently safeguards against the erroneous deportation of genuine asylum
seekers is the one implied by the Field Manual quotation noted above: a sort
of “beep test” in which, in the words of former INS General Counsel David
Martin, once “the interviewee mentions fear of return, the beep sounds
(figuratively) and the case is identified for referral to an asylum officer.”107
The problem is that this understanding – which is the only understanding
that can adequately protect genuine asylum seekers – has never been fully
103. CBP Inspector’s Field Manual § 17.15(d) (2001).
104. A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR, supra note 6, at 217. For what it is worth, one of the authors of this
Article (Pistone) was intimately involved with many of the events described in Professor Schrag’s A
Well-Founded Fear, and can often confirm his account based on first-hand knowledge. The path of the
I-867B’s development is one such event. See id. at 105-10.
105. A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR, supra note 6, at 216.
106. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 74; see Swarns, supra note 23, at 11 (noting report
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees that found inspectors “often lacked an
understanding of asylum law”).
107. Martin, supra note 95, at 681-82. Professor Martin was INS General Counsel from 1995 to
1998, the time period in which expedited removal was passed into law and implemented.
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accepted within the immigration services; indeed, it has been actively
resisted. Section 17.5(b) of the Manual, which authorizes an inspector to
ignore an individual’s assertion of fear when it “clearly would not qualify
that individual . . . for asylum,” constitutes the formal expression of the
resistance. That section provides the legal grounding for a pattern of training
and supervision that, from the start, has confused secondary inspection
officers and caused an inconsistent and erroneous application of the fear
standard.
Thus, the 2000 GAO study that found file evidence of erroneous deporta-
tion of individuals who asserted a fear also revealed evidence that inspection
officers’ training left them uncertain as to whether or not they were required
to “refer any alien claiming a fear of returning to his/her country to an asylum
officer.”108 Although at the time an INS official conceded that additional
training and clarification of the fear standard might be needed,109 based on
the USCIRF study, five years later that confusion clearly persists.
For example, in twelve sample cases directly observed by the USCIRF
staff, individuals who expressed fear – and who, therefore, “under DHS
regulations . . . should have been referred for a credible fear interview”110 –
were not so referred.111 In five of these cases, there was no basis whatsoever
for concluding that the expressed fear was non-qualifying. In two other cases,
USCIRF deemed the fear “ambiguous,” making them precisely the kinds of
cases that demand what the inspectors concededly lack – the ability to make
nuanced legal judgments. Finally, while one case was not characterized by
USCIRF, the report suggests that the claims of fear in four other cases were
more suspect; in three of these four cases, the expressed fear related to
economic hardship. However, experienced asylum practitioners often find
that ostensibly “economic” cases may in fact offer grounds for asylum. A
potential client may start by talking about economic hardship, for instance,
and only later reveal membership in a persecuted ethnic group suffering from
economic hardship rooted in the persecution of him or his group.112
In none of the twelve observed cases, accordingly, can the fear expressed
108. OPPORTUNITIES EXIST, supra note 14, at 43.
109. Id. at 40.
110. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 54.
111. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 21-23. Incidentally, “among the countries to
which the 12 aliens who expressed fear were returned, five of them (of nine) are noted to have
extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses in recent reports . . ., and two of the countries have
significant limitations on religious expression . . ..” Id. at 21.
112. Indeed, in recognition of this fact, the Credible Fear Manual of the U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, the component of DHS responsible for “service” functions such as the
naturalization process, as well as evaluating asylum claims through its corps of asylum officers and
immigration judges, see USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 28, instructs those officers that
“[t]he statement by an applicant that ‘I left my country because I can’t work’ is insufficient to judge
the merits of a case and should lead to further inquiry.” USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at
29 n.29. See Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 168 (3d Cir. 2003) (“defin[ing] persecution as
including . . . ‘economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a real threat to life or freedom’”
(quoting Lin v. INS, 238 F.3d 239, 244 (3d Cir. 2001))).
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clearly be classified as non-qualifying. The best that can be said on behalf of
the Field Manual standard allowing inspectors some discretion, is that its
application yields secondary inspection results that are often, but not neces-
sarily always, wrong. (Actually, the results are always wrong because an
appropriate policy would require a credible fear referral upon any invocation
of fear. Our point is that, even on its own terms, the Field Manual policy
produces demonstrably erroneous decisions.) This entirely predictable result
– predictable because inspectors so obviously lack the training (as well as the
time) to distinguish properly among types of fear – illustrates the reason why
a more demanding fear showing was rejected by the regulations of the parent
agency in the first place, i.e., because it would necessarily introduce a
disconcerting element of randomness into a process that does, after all,
potentially involve life-or-death decisions.113
In addition to endangering genuine asylum seekers, the Field Manual’s
amended fear policy produces other entirely predictable harms as well. In
Part II(A)(1), we discussed the paragraphs of the I-867A that must be read to
all persons subject to expedited removal; the final mandatory paragraph bears
re-reading:
U.S. law provides protection to certain persons who face persecution,
harm or torture upon return to their home country. If you fear or have a
concern about being removed from the United States or about being
sent home, you should tell me so during this interview because you may
not have another chance. You will have the opportunity to speak
privately and confidentially to another officer about your fear or
concern. That officer will determine if you should remain in the United
States and not be removed because of that fear.114
The incompatibility of this paragraph with the fear position articulated in
§17.15(b) of the Field Manual is jarring. As the I-867A indicates, CBP’s
approved policy is for a secondary inspector to promise an individual that
“[i]f you fear or have a concern about being removed,” “another officer [will
speak to you] about your fear or concern” and that “[t]hat officer will
determine if you should remain in the United States.” In the twelve cases
noted above (and in potentially thousands of unobserved cases) the following
scenario occurred: an individual admitted a fear and was then ordered
removed immediately by the very inspector who just promised the chance to
talk “privately and confidentially” to another officer who would make the
removal decision.
113. Indeed, given the similarity of the stakes, the introduction of this element of randomness
into the asylum process should be no more acceptable as a policy matter than were the standardless
death penalty determinations invalidated by the Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
239 (1972) and Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 199 (1976).
114. See USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 13, Box 2.1.
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Given this scenario, the collateral consequences of the Field Manual’s fear
policy – to the reputation of the United States, to the coherence of the
regulatory scheme, to the perceived fairness of the secondary inspection
process, to the integrity of the process, to inspectors’ own sense of integrity,
to the willingness of inspectors to read a “mandatory” paragraph that they
know is sometimes a lie, and to the development of an institutional culture
that values truth-telling – are evidently serious and universally unwelcome. It
is apparent that the managers responsible for development of the Field
Manual did not think through all the collateral implications of the policy
granting additional discretion, nor did they adequately appreciate the inabil-
ity of secondary inspectors to make the distinctions the new policy required,
or appropriately weigh the risks the policy creates for genuine asylum
seekers. And, most fundamentally, they ignored the plain meaning of the
regulation that their Field Manual ended up flouting, even though a plain
meaning reading would yield a result both more consistent with the remain-
der of the regulatory scheme and more workable in practice, given the
capabilities of secondary inspectors.115
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF CBP’S RULE-BREAKING ARE SIGNIFICANT
In Part III, we quantify the human toll of CBP’s failure to follow the rules
governing the treatment of possible asylum seekers in expedited removal.
Our calculation is extremely conservative, and almost certainly underesti-
mates the total number of genuine asylum seekers wrongly deported since the
implementation of expedited removal. For example, we do not include in our
calculation deportations via expedited removal of genuine asylum seekers
caused by: (1) the inappropriate exertion of pressure on asylum seekers to
withdraw their applications for admission;116 (2) the failure to use interpret-
ers or the use of inadequate or inappropriate interpreters;117 (3) the conditions
at secondary inspection, which are not conducive to full disclosure (e.g., the
handcuffing and shackling of asylum seekers);118 (4) the reliance by judges
on inaccurate or incomplete sworn statements as the basis for making adverse
credibility findings and denying asylum protection;119 (5) the “push back” of
asylum seekers at primary inspection;120 (6) the failure of appropriate or
sometimes any supervisors to review expedited removal orders and
115. A grant of discretion might be justified in extremely narrow circumstances, e.g., if an
interviewee responded to the question, “Do you have any fear about being returned to your home
country . . .?” by stating, “Yes, because I have a fear of flying.” To this point, however, CBP has
shown no ability or inclination to so confine the grant.
116. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
117. See supra Part II(A)(7).
118. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 23, at 61-63; see also supra note 23 and accompanying text.
119. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 44; USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at
67-70.
120. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 54-55; USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at
24. Such incidents can occur at a land crossing – although not at an airport, for example – as in the
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I-867s;121 and (7) mistakes made because of inadequate telephonic review of
I-867 forms by supervisors.122 Nor do we adjust any figures to account for the
operation of the Hawthorne effect – “where observers, by their mere
presence, influence the behavior under investigation” – even though it is a
virtual certainty that that effect has caused an underestimation of many of the
rules violations witnessed during the USCIRF study,123 just as it is a virtual
certainty that every one of the seven problems noted above have caused
genuine asylum seekers to be returned erroneously to homelands where they
may be persecuted.
Rather, we limit ourselves to the following three acts of noncompliance:
(1) failure to read the mandatory paragraphs of the I-867A;124 (2) failure to
refer individuals who indicated a fear of return to credible fear interviews;125
and (3) failure to ask and/or record the answers to the mandatory fear
questions of the I-867B.126 In calculating the number of persons wrongly
deported via expedited removal in a typical year, we have averaged figures
for the last four years to arrive at an annual total of approximately 71,000
applicants for admission placed into the expedited removal process, with
approximately 10,000 of those applicants referred by inspectors to credible
fear interviews.127 We have averaged figures over a multi-year period
because the figures tend to vary considerably from year-to-year; we have
selected the particular four-year period of 2000-2003 because that is the time
period selected by the USCIRF to serve as a comparative basis for some of its
own data collection efforts.128 It is also the most recent four-year set of data
available.
A. The Consequences of Failing to Read Mandatory Information from the
I-867A
As explained in detail in Part II(A)(1), secondary inspectors are required to
read mandatory scripted language to each of the 71,000 applicants for
admission who are put into the expedited removal process in an average year.
However, the USCIRF found that “in approximately half of inspections
observed, inspectors failed to inform” the applicants for admission of the
mandatory scripted information.129 According to the USCIRF report, those
former location a primary inspector can informally deny entry and then simply tell an asylum seeker
to leave.
121. See supra Parts II(B)(2) & (3).
122. See supra Part II(B)(4).
123. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 30-31.
124. See supra Part II(A)(1).
125. See supra Part II(A)(3).
126. See supra Part II(A)(2).
127. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS
149 (2004).
128. See USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 12.
129. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 6.
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who “did receive this information were seven times more likely to be referred
for a credible fear determination than those who were not.”130
The impact of this failure is shocking. It means that, annually, approxi-
mately 35,500 applicants for admission are not read the required script. If
people who are read the script are seven times more likely to be referred to
credible fear interviews, then approximately 8750 out of our annual average
of 10,000 people referred for credible fear interviews come from the half that
received the mandatory information, while only 1250 come from the group
that does not receive this information. The difference of 7500 constitutes the
number of individuals each year who are not referred to credible fear
interviews because of this failure alone.
B. The Consequences of Failing to Refer Individuals Who Mention Fear
to Credible Fear Interviews
As discussed in Part II(A)(3), many individuals have been subjected to
expedited removal because of the failure of secondary inspectors to refer all
individuals who mention a fear of return to credible fear interviews. Specifi-
cally, according to the USCIRF study, 15.2% of individuals who mention fear
are not so referred.131 In an average year, that means that approximately 1751
individuals who express a fear of return and hence should be referred to
credible fear interviews are instead deported immediately via expedited
removal.132
C. The Consequences of Failing to Ask and/or Record Answers to the Fear
Questions
As Part II(A)(2) details, the mandatory fear questions are designed to elicit
information relevant to whether applicants for admission should be sent to
credible fear interviews or expeditiously removed. The USCIRF report found
that the questions effectively achieve the intended result. Specifically, the
USCIRF report found that “the likelihood of referral for a Credible Fear
interview was roughly doubled for each [of the two explicit] fear question[s]
asked” (i.e., the likelihood was 4 times greater for individuals who were
asked both fear questions compared to those who were asked neither
question.)133
In particular, 18% of the applicants who were asked both explicit fear
questions were referred for credible fear interviews, while the comparative
130. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 6.
131. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 54; USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 20.
132. The 15.2% figure indicates that of every 8,480 persons who are appropriately referred, 1,520
persons are not. Adjusting these numbers for our annual approximate base of 10,000 appropriate
referrals yields a total of 1,751 additional persons who are improperly deported through the expedited
removal process each year.
133. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 17-18.
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figure for those who were asked only one of the questions was 8.6%, and the
percentage for those asked neither question was only 5.3%.134 Additionally,
5% of the time, neither question was asked, while only one question was
asked an additional 9% of the time.135 An extrapolation from these figures,
and our average annual base of 71,000 applicants placed into the expedited
removal process, leaves us with an expected shortfall of approximately 1052
persons per year who should have been referred to a credible fear interview,
but were not because of this failure.136
In conclusion, based on the USCIRF report’s findings, the total number of
applicants for admission who are not referred to credible fear interviews
because of these three failures amounts to more than 10,300 persons each
year – a figure that exceeds the total number of individuals actually referred
by inspectors for credible fear interviews in an average year. Given the very
small percentage of credible fear referrals that result in a negative credible
fear determination, the likely effect is that approximately 10,000 persons per
year are erroneously subject to a five-year bar on returning to the United
States137 and thousands are erroneously deported to face persecution.138 The
latter figure suggests that, over the entire course of expedited removal’s
almost nine-year history and based only on our partial accounting of the
damage, approximately 20,000 genuine asylum seekers have been refused
entry by the United States because those in charge of the process have broken
the rules meant to protect persons fleeing persecution abroad.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
Given the serious nature of the harm caused, reform of the expedited
removal process is urgently needed. In approaching this task, we agree with
Professor Jerry Mashaw, who wrote in his analysis of the administration of
the social security disability program that “[c]riticism and the reformist
instinct must be harnessed to an appreciation of reality.”139 In formulating
our suggested reforms, we must appreciate the overwhelming reality that the
culture in which expedited removal occurs is an enforcement culture,
134. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 17 tbl. 2.8.
135. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 54.
136. Out of an expected 6390 people (9% of 71,000) asked only one question, the difference
between a referral rate of 18% and a referral rate of 8.6% is 601 (1105 minus 549). Similarly, out of an
approximate 3,550 people (5% of 71,000) asked neither question, the difference between a referral
rate of 18% and a referral rate of 5.3% is 451 (639 minus 188). Adding together the two sums yields a
result of 1052 individuals.
137. In recent years, only about 1% of persons referred to credible fear hearings are given a
negative credible fear determination, USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 173 tbl. 1.0, and
subsequently removed pursuant to the expedited removal power. Accordingly, very few persons who
are referred to a credible fear hearing end up being subjected to the five-year ban.
138. Twenty-five percent of asylum seekers with counsel are granted asylum. Id. at 241. With the
assistance of paid counsel, pro bono attorneys, human rights organizations, and law school clinical
programs, almost 80% of all asylum applicants are represented by counsel at their hearings. Id. at
241 n.39; see also id. at 241-48 (noting several types of legal assistance available to asylees).
139. MASHAW, supra note 72, at 20.
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meaning that CBP (as well as its parent department, DHS) focuses on
enforcing the rules restricting illegal immigration, as opposed to maximizing
legal immigration or providing services to immigrants and potential immi-
grants. By its nature, especially after the events of September 11, 2001, this
culture will resist initiatives that are perceived as failing to serve the
enforcement mission.140
A realistic plan for reform, accordingly, must do more than recommend the
issuance of certain diktats from above. Plenty of diktats already exist, and
every study conducted of the expedited removal system has found that those
diktats are often ignored on the ground. Simply designing a better mousetrap,
in other words, is not enough.
Three years ago, Professor Lenni Benson introduced into the administra-
tive law literature a striking metaphor to clarify this concept. She character-
ized the various diktats from above – “the statutory provisions, regulations,
and implementing forms and instructions” – as a map and only a map. She
argued that “[t]he map is not the territory,”141 but rather, the territory is the
reality that the map symbolically represents, as the bureaucratic implementa-
tion is the reality that the diktats theoretically describe. Reform that focuses
exclusively on making a better map, with no regard for the territory, carries
with it a great and quite predictable risk of failure. A better map won’t help
you if, on the ground, “you can’t get to there from here.”142
Our aim is to offer recommendations that will allow the expedited removal
process to arrive, in fact, at a place where thousands of genuine asylum
seekers will no longer unnecessarily be put at risk of deportation. In order to
140. See Andrew I. Schoenholtz, Refugee Protection in the United States Post-September 11, 36
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 323, 329-32 (2005) (discussing enhanced “enforcement focus” after
September 11, 2001); Angelo A. Paparelli & John C. Valdez, September 11 Ushers in a New Era in
Immigration Law and Practice, Part II, 7 BENDER’S IMMIGR. BULL. 427, 427 (Apr. 15, 2002) (noting
that the INS’s planned reorganization in 2002 contained “ominous signs that the INS’s major focus
will be more on enforcement and less on service”). Paparelli and Valdez rightly characterize the
post-September 11 movement toward greater enforcement as “ominous” because, even before that
day, “the agency ha[d] become completely enforcement-minded.” Mirta Ojito, Change in Laws Sets
Off Big Wave of Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1998, at A1; see Daniel W. Sutherland, The
Federal Immigration Bureaucracy: The Achilles Heel of Immigration Reform, 10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
109, 119-20 (1996) (quoting former officials and others to the effect that enforcement and service
clash, “the enforcement mentality almost always wins”); Demetrios Papademetriou et al., Reorganiz-
ing the Immigration Function: Toward a New Framework for Accountability, 75 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 501, 504 (1998) (noting that “enforcement goals always seem to take precedence over
service goals”). Indeed, in the aftermath of 9-11, some evidence suggests that under the DHS even
service activities have taken on the characteristics of an enforcement program. See Louie Gilot,
Immigration changes; Citizenship office will put legacy of old INS on ICE, EL PASO TIMES, Mar. 20,
2004, at 1A (noting claim that “enforcement is getting in the way of service”); Ernesto London˜o,
Immigration changes in works, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 30, 2004, at 1B (noting “[e]nhanced
background checks introduced after 9-11 are leading to more arrests of felons who apply for
immigration benefits”); Vicki Kemper & Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar, U.S. Tries to Speed Flow of
Immigration Paperwork, L.A. TIMES, June 18, 2004, at A18 (noting post-9-11 requirement of “full
security checks” has slowed processing).
141. Lenni Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step Toward Immigration Law
Reform, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 203, 211 (2002).
142. Id. at 218.
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accomplish this goal, we have focused first on the territory, with several
recommendations we think will have the effect of changing the ground
environment in a way that will ultimately make CBP more receptive to
following diktats from above. After this, we offer some changes of the
map-making variety. The latter changes are important, but the former are
really the sine qua non of effective reform.
Our hope is that people on all sides of the debate will embrace our
recommendations because the need for effective reform has never been so
obvious or necessary as it is now. The need is more obvious than ever due to
the disclosures of the USCIRF report, which demonstrate, to a disturbing
degree, both the unreliability of the file records upon which prior studies have
primarily been based, and the great likelihood that the file records underesti-
mate to a significant extent the scale of CBP’s noncompliance with estab-
lished requirements. And the need for effective reform is now more necessary
than ever due to recent and perhaps future expansions of the expedited
removal power. When it began, expedited removal was limited to persons
who had just arrived at ports of entry, such as airports. Expansions in 2002
and 2004 extended expedited removal to “undocumented non-Cubans who
entered the United States by sea within the prior two years” and to “undocu-
mented aliens apprehended within 14 days after entry and within 100 miles
of the border, in the Tucson and Laredo Border Patrol sectors,” respec-
tively.143 Subsequent DHS initiatives further extended the latter policy
“across the entire southwest border” in 2005, and to the entire U.S.-Canadian
border and to all U.S. coastal areas in 2006.144 With the extensions, officers
inexperienced in expedited removal, working in offices similarly inexperi-
enced, are beginning to exercise the awesome and unappealable power of
deporting arriving persons and banning them from returning for five years or
more. In sum, there is no better time than the present to get it right, and we are
now better prepared to do so because we have a better picture of what can and
has gone wrong.
A. Reforming the Culture
Contrary to general belief, bureaucratic culture is easy to change. The
difficulty lies in making the change an improvement. A top-down, heavy-
handed approach is likely to be counter-productive. In reality, inspectors at
143. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 2.
144. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security, DHS Expands Expedited Removal
Authority Along Southwest Border (Sept. 14, 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/
display?content4816; Press Release, DHS Streamlines Removal Process Along Entire U.S. Border,
U.S. Department of Homeland Security (Jan. 30, 2006). In between the 2005 and 2006 DHS
initiatives, a legislative proposal to expand expedited removal to “all border patrol sectors on the
southern border of the United States” was passed in the U.S. House of Representatives. See Border
Patrol, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigrant Control Act of 2005, H.R. 4427, § 407 (passed Dec. 16,
2005).
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the border – and their managers – have a complicated job balancing the
“quite different, almost opposite, organizational objectives” of enforcement
and service.145 Anyone seeking to alter that balance has to be aware of the
delicacy of the task. The potential for orders from above to be misinterpreted
at ground level is significant. When the Social Security Administration
(SSA), for example, desired to make social security disability awards more
definite for certain claimants by classifying particular medical conditions as
per se disabling, it simultaneously and quite unintentionally sent the unde-
sired message that other conditions were “presumptively nondisabling.”146
Immigration officials are aware of this problem. Indeed, at least one may
have learned from the SSA example noted above, when a strikingly similar
issue came up during discussions about the rules to govern expedited
removal. As recalled in Professor Philip Schrag’s insightful memoir/study of
IIRIRA’s origins, passage and aftermath:
Some advocates echoed the call that Pistone and I had made for a
“problem list” of countries from which people would be assumed to be
escaping. A senior INS official dismissed this suggestion, saying that if
there were such a list, the inspectors would immediately deport anyone
who was not from a country on the list. I suggested that they could be
trained to use better judgment than that, but the official said that I was
“bucking human nature.”147
All things considered, the INS official may have been right. The flip side of a
generally commendable caution about the unintended effects of managerial
communications, however, is that it may lead to the conclusion that certain
deeply rooted, habitual and serious problems simply cannot be effectively
addressed. In this mindset, any proposed cure may be thought likely to be
worse than the disease.
In many contexts, the choice between a caution that may let acknowledged
problems fester, and action that may create new problems, can be a difficult
one. We appreciate the difficulty, but think there may be a way to sidestep it
in this case. An extension of Professor Benson’s metaphor may illuminate
our approach.
Our concern is to change things on the ground, not simply on the map.
Because of CBP’s strong enforcement culture, for asylum seekers that
145. Immigration Issues: Making Needed Policy and Management Decisions on Immigration
Issues: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Information, Justice, Transportation, and Agriculture of the
H. Comm. on Gov’t Operations, 103rd Congress 1 (1993) (statement of Henry R. Wray, Director,
Administration of Justice Issues, General Accounting Office).
146. MASHAW, supra note 72, at 66. Similarly, when SSA undertook additional review of one
state agency whose award rate for disability claims placed it among the more generous states, the
agency lurched within six months to a position as one of the least generous states, as examiners
became convinced that they were “required to interpret all policies in the most stringent fashion.” Id.
at 159-60.
147. A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR, supra note 6, at 200.
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ground is far drier and more inhospitable than it should be. A flood of
directives from above might change this, but as with all flooding, conse-
quences are unpredictable. CBP officials, appropriately, are cautious about
taking any actions that might wash away their enforcement culture or leave it
buried underwater. On the other hand, the enforcement culture is strong
enough – dry enough, let’s say – that a light sprinkling of directives is likely
to have no more permanent or substantial effect than a brief summer shower
on a hot desert floor. But what if we followed the lead of people who live in
dry climates? They typically construct irrigation systems that control and
direct the flow of water, allowing it to be absorbed into and transform the soil
day-by-day, drop-by-drop. We advocate a structural approach that will have a
similar effect, slowly changing the situation on the ground through a steady
application of forces that, over time, can counter the dominant enforcement
culture, without running the risk of uncontrolled and sudden change.
1. Regularize and Expand the Use of External Studies
We have lobbied against, thought and written extensively about, and
closely followed the literature on expedited removal for nearly a decade. We
have carefully read GAO studies, ABA reports, and other writings on the
subject. Still, in many ways, the USCIRF report came as a revelation. From
the 2000 GAO study, we knew inspectors sometimes failed to record answers
to the mandatory questions of the I-867B, but we did not know that
inspectors sometimes made up answers to questions that were never asked.
We now know that they do. From the 2000 GAO study, we knew supervisors
sometimes overlooked mentions of fear in approving expedited removal
orders, but we did not know that inspectors sometimes failed to include
mentions of fear in the I-867B sworn statement before recommending
expedited removal. Again, we now know that they do. And the revelations do
not end there; unfortunately, we could go on and on. Neither the alarming
frequency with which I-867A information is not conveyed, for example, nor
the overwhelming frequency with which the sworn statement is not read back
to applicants before being signed, were known before the USCIRF report
was published.
Information is power, it is rightly said, and there is no question that
revelations of the sort uncovered by the USCIRF study give power to those
who would want to modify CBP’s enforcement culture as it affects potential
asylum seekers. Such revelations attract the attention of Congress and the
press, provide impetus for scholarly articles such as this, and furnish solid
grounds for demanding future studies of the process. All of these means may
be utilized to attract allies and disarm opponents of reform. In this sense, to
the extent that they uncover excesses of an enforcement culture, external
studies can act as a type of counterforce to the dominant enforcement culture
that allows rules protective of asylum seekers to be broken so often and with
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such apparent impunity.
But we underestimate the reach of that counterforce if we limit it to
motivating outside forces to take action and exert pressure on CBP. Although
bureaucracies may lean very strongly in one direction or the other, no large
organization is an absolute monolith; indeed, during the development of the
regulations governing expedited removal, more than one INS official sug-
gested differences between their own positions and that of the inspectors.148
External studies that reveal problems in a program can be helpful in
moderating the dominant culture by providing new information to powerful,
relatively sympathetic officials, by strengthening the apparent merits of their
position in internal debates, and by giving the sympathetic officials a reason
not to easily capitulate to the hardliners in their agency in the interests of
maintaining internal peace. Such capitulation loses a lot of its charm when
the result is not peace but merely a change in the place of battle (e.g., to a seat
in a committee room before a hostile Senator).
Thus, external studies – whether by USCIRF, the GAO, non-governmental
organizations or independent scholars – can prove valuable by strengthening
the hands and increasing the resolve of moderate forces within the agency, as
well as by motivating elements of the larger political culture to action. The
influence of any particular study, naturally, will depend upon the robustness
of its findings. Another determinant of influence will be the recentness of the
findings. Both factors are, to some degree, within the control of the agency
under review. CBP, and the INS before it, rebuffed numerous attempts to
study expedited removal. Moreover, even congressionally mandated studies,
such as the ones of expedited removal by the GAO and USCIRF, are
dependent in numerous ways upon the cooperation of the agency being
studied. CBP, for example, affected the robustness and scope of the USCIRF
study by, among other things, limiting sample size and prohibiting interviews
of front-line CBP officers.149 By virtue of its efforts along these lines, for a
long time CBP was able to keep expedited removal “opaque not only to the
outside world, but even within the [DHS].”150
The lesson for the future is that, if controlling the excesses of the CBP’s
enforcement culture depends on making the process transparent enough so
that the excesses can be known, the larger political culture must rouse itself at
least enough to demand such transparency. We know from history that CPB is
unlikely to reveal its inner workings on its own initiative. However, the larger
political culture – that is, Congress and anyone who might influence
Congress – even if generally sympathetic to CBP’s enforcement mission,
may not regard its own interests as identical to CBP’s in this case. And
indeed, the two are not similarly situated in several important respects. The
148. A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR, supra note 6, at 204.
149. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 31-33.
150. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 76.
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larger political culture is more desirous of studies that provide information
because (1) it is more starved for that information, and (2) the cost of
gathering the information is minimal for the larger political culture but
substantial for the CBP, in terms of logistical planning and executive time,
among other costs.
How much information should the larger political culture demand? Given
the disappointing findings of the USCIRF study and CBP’s apparent inability
to fix problems identified in past studies, despite the passage of a number of
years, we think the trend should be toward more information and not less.
Congress should authorize a regular schedule of studies with the idea of
continuing them until substantial improvement is shown. A mix of studies is
appropriate – some of broad scope in subject matter and geographic focus
and others more narrowly focused. Because of the demonstrated unreliability
of the information contained in the files, most studies should utilize direct
observation to a substantial extent.
As studies accumulate, they may collectively help to produce a change in
CBP’s enforcement culture, at least if the studies’ results indicate a continua-
tion of the serious problems previously uncovered. Of course, bureaucracies
are well versed in ways to ignore studies that they do not like. To prevent this
from happening, Congress should require CBP to respond formally to at least
some of the studies.151 In addition, regularizing the schedule of studies also
will make it harder for CBP to ignore the studies’ results.
2. Employ Testers to Assess Compliance
Another technique that may be used to change CBP’s culture is to
regularly employ testers, i.e., actors who would go through the expedited
removal process to test whether CBP inspectors are following the rules.
Congress should require CBP to employ testers and to report the results
annually. The testers would pose as regular travelers arriving at the primary
inspections area with a group of passengers from an international air flight.
They would present fraudulent documents and at the proper time indicate that
they fear return to their home countries. The testers would be trained on the
proper expedited removal procedures and have practice identifying common
mistakes made by inspectors.
The use of testers could improve the expedited removal process in several
ways. First, as the knowledge that testers are being used spreads, it may
151. Requiring a formal response may be particularly useful in averting extreme cases of
bureaucratic denial, of which a recent statement by the chief of the Border Patrol, David V. Aguilar,
might stand as a paradigmatic example. Against the clear contrary showing by USCIRF, Mr. Aguilar
asserted that if cases of immigration officers subjecting persons arriving in the United States to
expedited removal without asking the mandatory fear questions “exist at all, I am very confident that
they are very small and very isolated. . . . The training of our agents is very involved, and there are
safeguards in place within the process to ensure that nobody falls through the cracks.” Rachel L.
Swarns, Rights Groups Criticize Speedy Deportations, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2006, at A9.
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increase inspector diligence. This would be especially likely if individual
inspectors who do not comply with the rules are held accountable for such
non-compliance. Moreover, the testers’ experiences could cumulatively re-
veal trends in non-compliance, such as whether inspectors are less likely to
follow the rules during certain shifts, during peak periods, during slow
periods, at certain ports of entry or when travelers are arriving from certain
countries. Finally, as noted previously, one of the great advantages CBP has
in maintaining the support of the larger political culture is that it gets to
deport its mistakes. Testers, however, will not disappear; indeed, they may
re-appear as they do in other contexts, such as in investigations of housing
discrimination, to provide powerful anecdotal evidence of the excesses of
CBP’s enforcement culture. In various ways, therefore, testers can directly
and indirectly help bring about a change in that enforcement culture.
3. Videotape Secondary Inspection Interviews
The institution of a policy of routinely videotaping secondary inspection
interviews from the beginning of the I-867AB process until after the
applicant signs the sworn statement would provide yet another means of
providing a counterbalance to the dominant enforcement culture. In particu-
lar, the availability of videotape could make studies of the expedited removal
process both more comprehensive and less intrusive to the ordinary workings
of the office. This would have numerous positive effects.
First, as a practical matter, it would allow for more studies to be conducted,
since the viewing of videotapes would be less disruptive to ports than having
to accommodate observers. As noted earlier in Part V(A)(1), maintaining a
regular schedule of studies is important because it makes it more difficult for
officials to ignore the results. Second, the larger sample sizes made practical
by the availability of videotapes would add to the robustness of studies’
findings and, therefore, make the studies a more effective counterweight to
the dominant enforcement culture. Not only would the results be more
definitive because a larger sample size tends to increase statistical signifi-
cance, but the ability to check and re-check the videotapes would increase the
reliability of the findings by decreasing the risk that otherwise undetectable
measurement quirks of individual observers could skew study results. In
addition, the availability of videotaping would enhance reliability by elimi-
nating measurement distortions caused by the Hawthorne effect; if the
videotaping is universal, the events being viewed are occurring exactly as
they ordinarily do.
Videotaping would also provide several other advantages. As with the use
of testers, the mere fact that inspectors know that they are being taped would
add an additional element of self-policing into the process.152 Further, a
152. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 33.
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sample of the videotapes could be reviewed periodically as supervisory and
training tools to ensure that inspectors know how to follow, and are
following, CBP rules and policies. Finally, the taped record of an interview
could protect an inspector from specious allegations of misconduct or allow
an applicant a means of proving a meritorious claim.
The recommendation for universal videotaping is a realistic one. In fact,
CBP is already videotaping secondary inspections at the Houston and Atlanta
ports of entry.153 CBP, accordingly, should expand its videotaping program to
all ports of entry, as well as to any other location in which expedited removal
interviews take place.
4. The Senior Asylum Officer Must Be an Asylum Advocate
Our last recommendation in this subsection must begin with a word of
praise for the Department of Homeland Security. DHS Secretary Michael
Chertoff recently announced the creation of a Senior Asylum Officer posi-
tion, to be located within a new Directorate of Policy. The Senior Asylum
Officer position, which was filled in February 2006 with the appointment of
Igor V. Timofeyey, will be responsible for Department-wide coordination of
policies, regulations and practices that impact asylum seekers.154 The appoint-
ment of Mr. Timofeyey is a promising decision. Whether the promise will be
fulfilled, however, is another matter entirely.
The key determinant of success or failure in this regard resides in the
particulars of how the Senior Asylum Officer position is conceived. If it is
regarded primarily as the position responsible for justifying current policies
and practices to parties interested in and concerned with asylum, the position
will be a great disappointment. In its coordination function, it may bring
some consistency to currently divergent practices across DHS and, all else
being equal, that is a good thing, but little else in the way of achievement is
likely.
On the other hand, the position could achieve a great deal if, in its
conception, it is regarded as a means to correct the systematic skew of CBP
and DHS toward enforcement concerns when those concerns intersect with
the interests of asylum seekers. Such a conception of the office would
indicate a great deal of administrative sophistication in the upper levels of
DHS. It would suggest a recognition of the truth that “tasks that are not part
of the core mission . . . need special protection,”155 and represent a determi-
153. Id.
154. Press Release, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff Announces Six-Point Agenda
for Department of Homeland Security (July 13, 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/
display? content4598 (last visited Jan. 30, 2006); Press Release, DHS Names Senior Advisor for
Refugee and Asylum Policy (Feb. 7, 2006) available at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?con-
tent5392.
155. JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES DO AND WHY THEY DO IT
371 (1989).
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nation to provide such protection.
There is precedent for conceiving an office in this manner. The Internal
Revenue Service (IRS), for example, has a National Taxpayer Advocate, a
high-level position charged with protecting taxpayer rights and recommend-
ing legislation to remedy problems that unnecessarily burden taxpayers.156
As the name implies, the Taxpayer Advocate is meant to balance a systematic
skew in the IRS in favor of the tax payee.
In addition to ensuring consistent legal interpretations and monitoring
emerging developments, a Senior Asylum Officer position so conceived
could undertake a number of initiatives to protect genuine asylum seekers
from an overly enthusiastic enforcement culture and to help change the
environment in which asylum decisions take place. For example, the Senior
Asylum Officer could play a role in formulating, selecting and approving
studies of the expedited removal process, as well as serve as a high-level
liaison between researchers and DHS officials. He also could play a role in
developing quality assurance procedures. Until now, “quality assurance” in
the CBP was something of a misnomer, as it relied “entirely on ‘self-
reporting’ by immigration inspectors.”157 Hopefully, the Senior Asylum
Officer’s different perspective will cause him to demand more from a quality
assurance program than the finding that all the inspectors are above average
(which is all that may be discovered when relying entirely on self-reporting).
Furthermore, the Senior Asylum Officer could advocate for the development
and release of better statistical information, as immigration statistics are notori-
ously confusing and incomplete.158 In addition, he could review training programs
and manuals to ensure that they effectively convey, and fairly and accurately
reflect, the law. The Senior Asylum Officer could also ensure that responsible
agencies within DHS respond to the findings and recommendations of any studies
that are conducted. Finally, his office could be publicized as an alternative point of
contact for persons who have witnessed incidents of mistreatment of asylum
seekers. In all these roles, the Senior Asylum Officer could act as a counterforce to
the dominant enforcement culture at DHS and CBP.
B. Changing the Rules
In addition to the above-referenced means of effectuating structural
change, various specific rule changes would also decrease the risk that
genuine asylum seekers would be returned to face possible persecution in
their homeland. We offer some practical examples below. None of our
examples, we concede, are likely to have a substantial effect in the absence of
156. CHARLES O. ROSSOTTI, MANY UNHAPPY RETURNS: ONE MAN’S QUEST TO TURN AROUND THE
MOST UNPOPULAR ORGANIZATION IN AMERICA 138-39, 275 (2005) (describing the purpose and
performance of the National Taxpayer Advocate).
157. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 74.
158. Id. at 73.
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a change in the overall cultural landscape of CBP. However, we do not think
implementation of our suggestions should be postponed pending movement
on the cultural front. First, the new rules we propose may have a marginally
positive effect even if implemented immediately in the current dominant
enforcement culture. Second, pre-cultural change implementation would
provide additional important measures of CBP’s compliance or noncompli-
ance when reviewed by future researchers.
1. Require Inspectors to Confirm in Writing that Required Information
Was Read to Applicants
As explained in Part II(A)(1), the requirement that inspectors read to all
applicants for admission the information on the I-867A is vital to ensuring
that asylum seekers understand the importance and finality of the secondary
inspection interview. Yet, the statement often is not read. Under current
practices, absent observation of the interviews by third parties, such failures
go undetected.
The USCIRF report recognized the importance of this problem, but was
content to rely on additional training, combined with the use of videotape and
testers, as a solution.159 The USCIRF suggestions are good ones, but we
recommend that this specific problem also be addressed more directly. In
particular, to increase the likelihood that inspectors read the required state-
ment, they should be required to confirm in writing that the statement was
indeed read to the applicant for admission. Form I-870, which is used by
asylum officers during credible fear interviews, provides a good model for
this proposed requirement.160 Question 1.28 on Form I-870 contains a box
that the asylum officer must check to confirm that he or she read a required
paragraph to the applicant; in substance, the required paragraph of the I-870
is similar to the mandatory paragraphs of the I-867A. The I-867 could easily
be amended to provide a similar assurance that the inspector read each
mandatory paragraph aloud to the applicant for admission.
Amending the I-867 in this manner would promote diligence among
inspectors and add to the effectiveness of supervisory review. As it now
stands, busy inspectors have little incentive to comply fully with the
mandatory reading requirement, and supervisors have no way of checking
inspectors who fail to do so. Given the importance of the I-867 information,
remedying these deficiencies in some way seems long overdue.
2. Telephonic Supervisory Reviews Should Be Banned
While USCIRF did not make any recommendations as to the conduct of
the supervisory review process, CBP should also revise its policy that allows
159. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 74.
160. See USCIRF REPORT, vol. 2, supra note 11, at 254 (copy of Form I-870).
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supervisors to review I-867 sworn statements over the telephone. As noted in
Part II(B)(4), telephonic review lessens the overall accuracy and accountabil-
ity of the review process. Given the important check that supervisory review
is designed to play in preventing the removal of individuals who express a
fear of return, it is vital that supervisors have as much information about the
secondary interview as is available, and that the information is presented
fully, accurately and adequately.
The very nature of a telephonic review suggests that important information
will not be presented fully or adequately. For busy supervisors, it is likely
tedious to listen to the sworn statement aloud, difficult to pick up on subtle
nuances of the statement, and infuriatingly time-consuming to try to go back
and forth in the statement to see how different parts of it relate to each other.
There is a strong temptation to shortcut the process, particularly in the harried
environment of secondary inspection. Requiring review of the record in
written form reduces these temptations and, in all events, enhances account-
ability when the temptation proves too much to resist; the contents of the
written record can later be reviewed while the content of a telephone
conversation cannot.
Requiring review of the written record is a practical reform. In addition to
enhancing the effectiveness of the review process, it would also be more
efficient. Most importantly, it would save time, largely eliminating the time
wasted in coordinating schedules to arrange a phone call. Secondary inspec-
tors’ time also would be saved because they would ordinarily be removed
from the review process entirely. Similarly, as most people can read faster
than they can talk, supervisors would save time, too – assuming, that is, that
the telephonic review constituted a full review of the record. If it did not, of
course, that lessens the efficiency argument, but heightens the argument that
a telephonic review tends to be an inadequate review.
Despite the relative efficiency of a written review, in the past there has
been a tendency to rely on telephonic review, particularly in those ports of
entry in which supervisors are not stationed near the inspectors. If physical
distance were ever a justification for the practice of telephonic review, it is no
longer so. The transcript and answers to questions on most sworn statements
are electronically processed. Inspectors could be required to send the tran-
script through a computer network to the supervisor, who would be able to
access it wherever he or she is physically stationed.161
Moreover, even if the electronic transfer of files is not feasible in
certain ports of entry, fax machines could be used. Indeed, equipping
ports of entry with fax machines would itself be cost efficient, as the cost
161. The only complications that might arise from this approach are the supervisor’s ability to
check that the sworn statement was signed, and to note corrections that might have been made to the
form by the applicant. Neither complication seems insurmountable. The inspector could otherwise
confirm that the form was signed, and corrections by the applicant could be noted through the use of
the “track changes” function common to most word-processing programs.
2006] EXPEDITED REMOVAL FAILS ASYLUM SEEKERS 207
of a fax machine is minimal compared to the expense of having two
people do the job of one – and do it more slowly – over and over and over
again.162
3. Any Statement of Fear Should Result in a Credible Fear Referral
As discussed in Parts II(A)(3) and (B)(5), individuals who express a fear of
return have nonetheless been expeditiously removed despite a clear regula-
tory directive prohibiting inspecting officers from proceeding any further
with removal in such cases. The USCIRF report recognizes this problem and
recommends that CBP “[r]econcile conflicting guidance to require that any
expression of fear . . . must result” in referral of the case to an asylum
officer.163 We agree with this recommendation, except to the extent that it is
modified by USCIRF’s additional recommendation that a new procedural
step be recognized between the secondary inspection interview and a referral
to a credible fear interview when the inspector has doubts about the adequacy
of the applicant’s expression of fear. We think it is fair to describe USCIRF’s
position as recognizing a different procedural track for what we shall call
“fear, but” cases, where fear of return has been expressed, but for some
reason the inspector does not think the fear is enough to warrant a credible
fear interview. The new procedural middle step would involve “contact with
an asylum officer to speak to the alien via a telephonic interpretation service
to determine whether or not the alien needs to be referred [for a credible fear
interview].”164
While the USCIRF’s call to clarify the fear standard is a welcome one,
recognition of the “fear, but” standard, with its attendant telephonic asylum
interview, is problematic. The idea is concededly premised on the incompe-
tence of inspectors to distinguish between “fear” cases that require a credible
fear interview with an asylum officer and “fear” cases that do not require
such an interview. The problem of this incompetence was originally and
wisely resolved by requiring credible fear referrals in all such cases. We
believe that USCIRF’s proposal is less a solution to this problem of
inspector-level incompetence than an addition to it.
USCIRF assumes that asylum officers would be competent to decide
properly the “fear, but” cases identified by inspectors in the less welcoming
environment of secondary inspection. Careful consideration reveals this
assumption to be erroneous. In its proposed middle-step interview, USCIRF
clearly expects asylum officers to delve into the nature of the fear expressed
by the applicant – not merely confirm the utterance of a fear of return. But
162. In fact, the future cost might be truly minimal; the CBP Inspector’s Field Manual suggests
that inspectors’ workplaces already are equipped with fax machines. See CBP Inspector’s Field
Manual § 17.15(b)(3).
163. USCIRF REPORT, vol. 1, supra note 11, at 74.
164. Id.
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exploring the nature of an applicant’s fear is exactly what an asylum officer
does in a credible fear interview; by its very nature, therefore, this middle-
step interview is essentially a quasi-credible fear interview. There are already
regulations, however, detailing the conditions thought necessary to an
accurate determination of the nature of an applicant’s fear.
Thus, the statute that created the expedited removal system expressly
mandates that the inspecting officer “refer the alien for an interview by an
asylum officer under subparagraph (B)” when a fear of persecution or an
intention to apply for asylum is indicated.165 The subparagraph (B) interview
must be conducted pursuant to several specific rules designed to create
conditions that will encourage full disclosure by the applicant for admission,
including the right to reschedule the interview because of illness, fatigue or
other impediments;166 the right “to consult a person . . . of the alien’s
choosing prior to the interview”;167 the right to present evidence;168 and the
right to have present at the interview a representative who, in the asylum
officer’s discretion, may be permitted to “present a statement at the end of the
interview.”169 None of these rights would be available in the proposed
telephonic interview with an asylum officer, and all of them are otherwise
mandated because they were thought necessary to accurately determine
whether the nature of the applicant’s fear satisfied the “credible fear”
standard.
The interview contemplated by USCIRF, accordingly, is essentially an
unreliable, second-class, credible fear interview. As to the system-wide
impact that this second-class interview might have in practice, three possibili-
ties emerge. First, if it rarely is used, the minor gain in efficiency that might
be achieved would hardly seem worth the muddling of what otherwise would
be an extremely clear standard. Second, if the second-class interview is used
frequently and often leads to an inspector-authorized deportation, enforcement-
minded inspectors untrained in asylum law will have a powerful incentive to
advance the enforcement objective by shifting the forum for investigating the
nature of an applicant’s fear from the official credible fear interview, with all
its accompanying rights, to a makeshift forum of dubious accuracy with no
specified rights. Finally, if the second-class interview is used frequently and
often leads to an official credible fear interview, rather than to an inspector-
authorized deportation, the system will become less efficient by requiring, in
many cases, asylum officers to conduct two interviews instead of one.
In sum, maintaining a low and certain threshold for the fear standard is
itself an important safeguard for ensuring that genuine asylum seekers are not
erroneously returned to their homelands. Speculating that the combined
165. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii) (2005).
166. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(1) (2005).
167. 8 C.F.R. § 208.30(d)(4) (2005).
168. Id.
169. Id.
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efforts of an inadequately trained inspector and an asylum officer handi-
capped by unfavorable conditions will somehow discern the truth seems an
unwise and unacceptable gamble. Accordingly, the only appropriate under-
standing of the fear standard – that any mention of fear requires a referral to a
credible fear interview – should be reasserted, without qualification or
modification.
4. Require Re-interviewing by Supervisors in Certain Circumstances
Finally, as a means of urging diligence in completing the sworn statement,
CBP should consider requiring immediate supervisors to re-interview appli-
cants for admission when the record of the secondary inspection interview is
facially incomplete, such as when the fear questions have not all been asked
and answered. Beyond signaling upper management’s interest in the issue,
instituting this rule would create the right incentives to ensure diligence
throughout the CBP hierarchy. Second-line supervisors would want their
operation to run efficiently, without unnecessary duplication; immediate
supervisors would want to please their supervisors and to spend their time
supervising rather than doing the job of a front-line inspector; and inspectors
would prefer not to have to deal with an angry boss (or bosses). Once the
immediate supervisor re-interviewed the applicant, the completed file would
be returned to a second-line supervisor for another review (or, if appropriate,
sent to an asylum officer for a credible fear interview). In some cases, staffing
considerations might make this recommendation impractical; perhaps this is
why the recommendation has not been made before. But CBP can hardly
contend that our proposed rule is overly strict, as the immigration service is
notorious for returning paperwork for even minor omissions.170
V. CONCLUSION
Under the best of circumstances – meaning when every required safeguard is
fully implemented and all pertinent information is accurately recorded by an
inspector and carefully reviewed by a supervisor, all pursuant to appropriate
written direction from above – the expedited removal process established by
IIRIRA would still call upon immigration inspectors to deny entry more quickly,
more often, and with less information and training than the old system of
experienced judges whose mistakes, in all events, were subject to multiple layers of
review by even more experienced judges. Given this, only the most naı¨ve persons,
and probably not even they, would deny that, even implemented under ideal
circumstances, the expedited removal system is more prone to error than the
concededly less-than-perfect system that preceded it.
170. See A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR, supra note 6, at 195; Suzanne Lee, Technology Helps
Immigrants Deal with the INS, ASIAN WEEK., Nov. 8-15, 2001, available at http://www.asianweek.com/
2001_11_09/news _ins.html.
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Hence, far too often – to note a partial list of shortcomings – the reality of
expedited removal is one in which mandatory information does not get
disseminated, mandatory questions do not get asked, mandatory credible fear
referrals are not made, and mandatory supervisory reviews are but a mockery
of the judicial hearings they were intended to replace. As a result of the
failure to perform these mandatory requirements, thousands of genuine
asylum seekers have been erroneously returned to their homelands to face
possible imprisonment, torture, or other manners of persecution.
Faced with these facts, no one can take refuge in the hope that the promise
of expedited removal can be salvaged without substantial reform. Various
blueprints for successful reform might be drawn, but no plan can possibly
succeed without taking CBP’s enforcement bias into consideration. A success-
ful plan must understand and counterbalance that bias.
This demands, most of all, that the process be made more transparent to,
and open to the influence of, persons outside CBP, DHS and the entire federal
government. The means used to provide this necessary transparency can and
should be varied, and should include: regularly scheduled studies by various
organizations and individuals; improved record-keeping, especially the exact
record provided by videotaping; the recruitment and use of testers, who can
provide a unique and valuable perspective on a process that has largely been
hidden from view; and greater influence over and oversight of the process by
persons, such as the Senior Asylum Officer, who are not part of the
enforcement culture. When more transparency is attained by these means, but
not before, it will again become possible to hope that the expedited removal
process will work as planned.
We are under no illusions that our recommendations, if implemented, will
make expedited removal a perfect system. Fast food and instant coffee aren’t
perfect, either. And there is no denying that the system demands a lot from
inspectors who traditionally merely processed applications for admission
rather than judged them, as they do now. Given all this, eternal vigilance in
the form of constant oversight may be the price of mediocrity only. Regretta-
bly, however, it is a sad but true commentary on where we stand now that
attaining mediocrity would be a tremendous improvement, indeed – one that
might best be measured by nothing less than the saving of many vulnerable
lives.
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